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8.1  Introduction 
Country funds are publicly traded investment companies (closed-end funds) 
that trade on the open market and, unlike domestic-equity  funds, hold  and 
manage portfolios concentrating  in the equity markets of  particular foreign 
countries. Throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, country funds were 
the fastest growing segment of the public fund universe, and a minor sensation 
on Wall Street. In December 1984 only four U.S.-listed country funds existed. 
By December 1992, forty-one funds traded in New York, each specializing in 
one of twenty-six countries, and altogether representing $4.3 billion in market 
value of equity.' 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the recent growth in the number of U.S.-based country 
funds by charting the dollar volume of initial public offerings (IPOs) by fund 
and by  year from  1981 to 1992. The rise in country fund IPOs parallels the 
growth in capitalization and liquidity in foreign stock markets. As of  1993, 
there were some forty foreign equity markets in the world, and non-U.S. equity 
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I. The precursors to the modern publicly traded country funds were the internationally diversi- 
fied investment trusts first formed in Great Britain in the 1860s.  They originally invested in foreign 
government bonds, and eventually diversified into foreign industrial bonds, land mortgages, and 
American railroad debentures. Foreign equity funds in the United States have a history dating back 
to 1951-52  with the Israel Development Corporation and the Canadian Fund. During the 1980s, 
the London and Hong Kong stock exchanges also emerged as centers for country fund trading. 
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Fig. 8.1  Initial public offerings of country funds: 1981-92 
Source: Moody’s Financial Handbook. 
market capitalization was twice as great as U.S. capitalization. The country 
funds allow US.-based investors to participate in the expansion of foreign mar- 
kets by providing a managed and diversified portfolio at a minimal transaction 
cost, and without the use of foreign currencies to make settlemenk2 
Country funds have exhibited periods of high returns as well as high volatil- 
ity. Like most publicly traded funds, country funds typically trade at substantial 
discounts to the underlying value of the portfolio they hold (the fund’s net asset 
value or NAV). The discount, however, is not constant, and varies substantially 
over time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the unusual volatility in country 
fund  prices  can  be  attributed  to  volatility  in  the  discounts.  Consider  the 
changes in the discount/premium  of  the Mexico Fund from  1986 to  1993, 
shown in figure 8.2A. The fund typically traded at a discount in the range of 0 
percent to 40 percent. The discount varies substantially from week to week, 
occasionally turning into a premium. Variation in the Mexico Fund’s discount 
is typical of many country funds and cannot be easily attributed to identifiable 
news events. 
In  addition to high volatility, some country funds have also experienced 
crashlike episodes unrelated to the state of the foreign stock market. Figure 
8.2B shows the behavior in the discount of the Germany Fund. This country 
fund was subject to especially volatile swings in the winter of  1989-90  as the 
2. Recent work on international investment  has  stressed the role of foreign and emerging mar- 
kets in effective  diversification (Divecha, Drach, and Stefek  1992). Diwan and Galindez (1991) 
and Diwan, Ermnza, and Senbet (1992) discuss the role of country funds from the host country’s 
perspective. 347  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
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Fig. 8.2B  Weekly percentage discount or premium of the Germany Fund 
premium rose to 100 percent after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Popular accounts 
of the episode attributed it to speculation on the part of investors waiting to 
“cash in” on new investment opportunities in Germany. What made the behav- 
ior doubly impressive was that it seemed to carry a cross-border contagion. 
Between November 9 and January 26, the Austria (AUS), the First Iberian 
(FIB), the Italy (ITL), the Swiss (Helvetia) (SWH), and the far-flung Malaysia 
(MLY), Thai (THA), and Taiwan (TAW) funds experienced dramatic but short- 
lived increases (decreases) in the premium (dis~ount).~  Figure 8.2B sueeests 
3. The rise (fall) in the premiums (discounts) between November 3, 1989 and January 26, 1990 
were as follows: AUS: 77 percent, FIB: 54 percent, SWH: 21 percent ITL: 29 percent, MLY 55 
percent, THA: 60 percent, TAW 27 percent. 348  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
that the events of  1989 have not yet dissipated for the Germany Fund. Whereas 
the fund traded at a discount of between  20 percent and 0 percent prior to 
November 1989, on a typical day following October 3, 1990, the fund traded 
at a premium. 
Discounts contradict the value-additivity principle of efficient and friction- 
less capital markets. However, as Rozeff (1991) notes, truly frictionless mar- 
kets do not exist. In efficient and frictionless markets, investment companies 
would not arise because they could not offer diversification services at a lower 
cost than zero, and no benefit could accrue to professional managers. There- 
fore, because the funds exist, they should be expected to trade at prices differ- 
ent than  the NAV.  Intriguing  issues, of  course, relate  to the source  of  the 
frictions and  inefficiencies that  give rise  to the existence,  persistence,  and 
time-variation in discounts (Brauer 1992). 
The behavior of country fund discounts may reflect items that preclude cost- 
less cross-border transactions: official and unofficial barriers to capital move- 
ments, transaction costs, time mismatch in trading hours, or risk arising from 
the time required to complete a full arbitrage transaction. Barriers to capital 
movements, for example, could potentially explain the variability of the dis- 
count: in a segmented market, the price of a U.S.-based country fund is deter- 
mined by the diversification needs of U.S. investors, whereas the NAV  of the 
fund is determined by  the diversification needs of  the investors in the fund’s 
host country. Put differently, the relevant (priced) systematic risks of the fund 
and its net assets are based on different benchmark portfolios in segmented 
markets. Weekly changes in the gap between price and net asset value could 
be generated by time variation in the difference between these risk measures. 
Alternatively, discounts may  be caused not by  market frictions but rather 
by the mechanism of public trading. This explanation emphasizes the role of 
irrational investors, called “noise traders” or “ordinary investors,” who interact 
in the market with rational investors (DeLong et al. 1990; Shiller 1984; Zweig 
1973). Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) evaluate empirically this explanation 
of the behavior of fund discounts using data on domestic-equity funds. An 
important feature of this model is the variation in the demand of noise traders 
caused by shifts in “sentiment” or by “misperceptions” of fundamental value. 
DeLong et al., for example, characterize sentiment as the excess of  investor 
return expectations over the mathematical expectations. While variation in sen- 
timent potentially explains variation in country fund discounts, DeLong et d. 
add structure to their model by introducing the idea of  noise-trader  risk. If 
variation in investor sentiment or misperceptions on individual assets vary sys- 
tematically, then assets subject to sentiment will be riskier and underpriced, on 
average, relative to fundamentals. 
The first aim of the present paper is to characterize some empirical regulari- 
ties of country fund prices. Owing to the recent emergence of country funds, 
relatively little empirical work has been conducted on their pricing; much of 
the evidence remains anecdotal. In contrast, there is a large body of empirical 349  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
literature on the behavior of prices of domestic-equity funds. A second aim is 
to examine whether the sentiment model is consistent with closed-end fund 
pri~ing.~  Accordingly, the paper relies on the noise-trader model to motivate 
and guide the empirical relationships that we examine using the country funds. 
The empirical regularities we uncover present a challenge to asset pricing mod- 
els that assume investor rationality and market efficiency, but this challenge is 
left to future research. 
Country funds have a number of  distinct advantages over domestic-equity 
funds in determining the validity of models based on investor sentiment. First, 
country fund discounts are better suited to detect movements in sentiment than 
domestic-equity fund discounts. As noted by Chopra, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 
(1993), the discounts of domestic-equity funds may not fully capture swings 
in sentiment because the same U.S. investor sentiment affects both the price 
of the fund and its underlying assets, so that swings in investor sentiment leave 
the discount largely intact. US.-based country funds, on the other hand, may 
not suffer from this problem; while their prices would be subject to U.S. inves- 
tor sentiment, prices of their underlying assets (which determine the NAV) will 
be determined largely on foreign equity markets, which, presumably, are not 
subject to U.S. investor sentiment. Variation in the discounts of the country 
funds would, therefore, reflect any diflerences in sentiment between U.S. and 
foreign-based investors, resulting in  both  more  volatility in  discounts and 
greater statistical power. 
Second, compared with domestic-equity closed-end funds, the comovement 
of country fund discounts provides a stronger indication of common variation 
in sentiment than of common variation in fundamentals. The underlying assets 
of domestic-equity funds are U.S. stocks, and thus a large component of their 
prices or NAVs is due to common variation in U.S. fundamentals. On the other 
hand, the underlying assets of different country funds are equities of different 
countries, and thus common cross-country variation in fundamentals repre- 
sents a much smaller fraction of the total variation in country fund discounts. 
Finding a strong common component in discounts across country funds is, 
therefore, more likely to be the result of common variation in U.S. investor 
sentiment than the result of common cross-country variation in fundamentals. 
Finally, compared with domestic-equity funds, country funds enable us to 
analyze a richer array of  factors that may potentially drive the movement of 
investor sentiment and misperceptions over time. Such factors can be changes 
in foreign exchange rates, host country stock prices, world stock prices, and 
U.S. stock prices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 8.2 reviews the styl- 
ized facts regarding the pricing of publicly traded funds. The same section 
extends the model of DeLong et al. in a multiasset context. The predictions of 
4. In this regard, the work presented in Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1993) is in the  same spirit and 
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the model subsequently serve as a heuristic guide for our empirical work. Sec- 
tion 8.3 discusses our data and its sources and provides some additional institu- 
tional facts about country funds. Section 8.4 focuses on the time-series behav- 
ior of country fund prices. Section 8.5 explores the determinants of the returns 
on country funds. In particular, the section examines the response of the fund 
returns and discounts to financial variables such as foreign stock market re- 
turns,  exchange rates,  and U.S. stock returns.  Section 8.6 summarizes our 
main conclusions. 
8.2  The Closed-End Fund Puzzle and the Noise-Trader Model 
8.2.1  The Puzzle 
Unlike an open-end mutual fund, the shares of a publicly traded fund cannot 
be redeemed at net asset value and thus the link between the market value of 
the fund  shares and  the  market  value  of  the  fund’s NAV  is tenuous.  The 
“closed-end fund puzzle” refers to the finding that publicly traded funds always 
trade either at a discount or at a premium to their respective NAVs. The empiri- 
cal literature finds that discounts are the 
The existence and persistence of discounts seem to contradict the value- 
additive principle of frictionless efficient capital markets. Moreover, no gener- 
ally accepted explanation for the existence of premia and discounts exists. Ex- 
planations  of  this puzzle  consistent with  market efficiency and frictionless 
capital markets emphasize that the fund’s net asset value may be mismeasured. 
For example, the reported NAV  does not correctly account for management 
fees, illiquid “letter stock” in the portfolios, or the implicit capital-gains tax 
liability on unrealized price appreciation (see Boudreaux  1973 and Roenfelt 
and Tuttle  1973). However, the above sources of  NAV  mismeasurement can 
only partially explain the existence of persistent discounts on domestic-equity 
funds (Malkiel  1977; Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler  199  1).  Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence and academic research suggest that the mismeasurement hypotheses 
are unable to explain the variation in discounts across funds.6 
In light of the problems in explaining the discounts, both generally and for 
country funds, Brauer (1992) stresses that further insights might be derived 
from research into the behavior of discounts through time. In this regard, Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler summarize four stylized facts concerning the time-series 
properties of domestic-equity closed-end funds, which cannot be explained by 
the mismeasurement hypothesis.’ Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler assert that any the- 
5. Lee,  Shleifer, and  Thaler  (1991).  for example,  examine  a  sample  of  twenty  primarily 
domestic-equity stock funds and find that on average, the value-weighted discount on a portfolio 
of these funds trades at 10 percent less than the NAV  over the period 1965-85. 
6. Ammer (1990), for example, finds that the organizational  expenses of  British closed-end 
funds fail to play a role in the time-series or cross-sectional variation in discounts. 
7. The stylized facts are as follows. First, new funds are typically priced at a premium reflecting 
underwriting and organizational costs. Subsequent to the IPO, funds tend to underperform relative 
to other IPOs and returns on the net asset value (Peavey 1990 and Weiss 1989). Six months follow- 351  What Moves the Discount on  Country Equity Funds? 
ory purporting to explain the existence of discounts must also be consistent 
with the stylized facts. However, the standard explanations cannot, separately 
or together, explain the ancillary pieces of the puzzle represented by the styl- 
ized facts. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler demonstrate that the noise-trader model 
of DeLong et al. is not only consistent with the stylized facts, but implies them 
as well. Using a sample of primarily domestic-equity funds, Lee, Shleifer, and 
Thaler test those implications of  the model which had not been derived or 
tested in the context of other theories of discounts. 
8.2.2  A Model of Investor Sentiment 
We  now present a general multiasset version of  a model with both rational 
(informed) investors and noise traders in order to motivate the implications of 
the sentiment model for country fund data. The economy contains one riskless 
asset, which earns a gross rate of return 1 + I;  and K risky assets, which we 
interpret as equities. The risky assets are infied supply which we denote by 
the K-dimensional vector L. The number of shares of each risky asset is normal- 
ized to equal one, so that L is a vector of ones. We let P,  and D,  denote the K- 
dimensional vectors of  the prices and dividends paid on the K  risky assets, 
respectively. The j” element of PI  and D,  represents the price and dividend of 
the j, asset, respectively. As in DeLong et al. (1990) and Shiller (1984),  we 
postulate the existence of two representative agents: a rational (informed) in- 
vestor and an ordinary investor (noise trader). Informed investors are present 
in the market in measure 1 -  F; noise traders are present in measure p,. 
The informed agent chooses his portfolio to maximize his perceived ex- 
pected utility given his own beliefs about the mean of the normally distributed 
with-dividend price vector (P,,, + D,+,): 
(1) 
Here A:  is a K-dimensional vector representing the demand for shares by the 
informed investor, while 0  is the variance-covariance matrix of (PI+,  + D,,,), 
and y is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Theyh  element in A:  represents 
the  number of  shares of  risky  asset j demanded by  the representative in- 
formed agent. 
Whereas informed agents respond only to expected returns optimally fore- 
cast, noise traders respond to another factor denoted by  pt. pI is assumed to 
enter the demand of  noise traders in linear fashion and represents either an 
over- or underreaction to news about fundamentals or represents a “fad.” For 
A:  = a,-  “E,(P,+,  + O,+J -  (1 + WJy. 
ing the IPO, the average fund trades at a significant discount. Second, Brauer (1984) and Brickley 
and Schallheim (1985) show that when funds announce plans to open-end or liquidate (and distrib- 
ute the proceeds to shareholders) the discounts move toward zero and positive returns accrue to 
fund shareholders. Third, fund prices appear to be excessively volatile: the variance of fund returns 
exceeds the variance of  returns on the underlying assets (Sharpe and Sosin 1975). Finally, portfo- 
lios of funds with large discounts subsequently generate excess risk-adjusted returns (Thompson 
1978), and abnormal profits can be generated using the information content of publicly disclosed 
discounts (Richards, Fraser, and Groth 1980; Anderson 1986). 352  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
now, we adopt DeLong et al.’s (1990) assumption that  p, captures the noise 
trader’s misperception of the expected with-dividend price vector of the risky 
assets. Specifically, the demand of the noise trader is given by 
(2) 
That is, if the rational expectation of P,  + , + D,  + I  is given by ,(P,  +  + D,  + I), 
then the noise trader’s expectation is given by  ,(P,+,  + D,+l)  + p,.  The two 
investors’ problems are similar except for the term  p  in (2).  When the noise 
trader is “bullish” on risky asset j,  theyh  element of the vector p is large, and 
he will nominally demand more shares of that asset than the rational investor. 
The demand functions reflect a crucial assumption made by DeLong et al.: that 
investors’ horizons are short, so that they care only about their wealth, one 
period hence.* 
Market clearing requires: (1 - p)A  :+FA;.  = L.  Substituting the demand 
functions into the equilibrium condition yields required excess returns: 
(3) 
Equation (3) suggests that equilibrium returns are relatively high when noise 
traders are bearish. In other words, ordinary investors systematically “mis- 
time” the market. The limit of (3) as the measure of noise traders, IJ., goes to 
zero is the ordinary efficient markets model. 
To derive useful closed-form solutions, we assume that both dividends and 
sentiment follow first-order autoregressive  processes. Thus, for any asset j,  j = 
1, . . . ,K, that earns dividends or is subject to sentiment: 
A;.  = a;’  [E,P,+, + D,+J  + p, -  (1 + 4  P,Ih. 
qJq+l) = E,(P,+I + D,+J -  (1 + r)P, = Ya,L  -  PP,. 
-  (4)  d,,,+I  = d)JdJ,,+vJ,f+l‘  ‘,.,+I  -  ‘:+I  + ‘yt+I 
-  (5)  PJ.,+I = qJPJ,, + ‘,,+I;  ‘J,,+,  -  ‘?+I  + ‘;,,+I’ 
The disturbance terms, v and u, are assumed to be normally distributed, white 
noise processes. Each error term contains two components. The systematic 
component, denoted by P  for fundamentals, and by  zp for sentiment, is a white 
noise, normally distributed shock common to all assets. P  and zp may be con- 
temporaneously correlated. The idiosyncratic terms, denoted by  cd  for funda- 
mentals and by  EP  for sentiment, are white noise, normally distributed errors 
that are contemporaneously uncorrelated across assets and between sentiment 
and fundamentals. Equations (4) and (5) embody DeLong et al.’s assumption 
that noise traders’ sentiment is stochastic and cannot be perfectly forecasted by 
rational investors. Closed-form steady-state solutions for prices and expected 
returns on any risky asset j are given by 
8. The demands of the two representative agents can be derived as the first-order condition of a 
problem in which each agent maximizes the expected value of an exponential utility function in 
next-period wealth and where asset prices are normally distributed (DeLong et al. 1990). 353  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
where the u  terms represent the steady-state covariances of  the error terms 
from (4) and (5) with aggregate wealth kY  where W = xbl(pk  + 4);  and P = 
(1 + r)-'. 
If  variation in sentiment for asset j is not idiosyncratic, but instead reflects 
systematic variation in noise trader sentiment which affects other assets, or is 
positively correlated with innovations in fundamentals, then the covariance 
term uuPw  in (6) and (7) will be positive. By raising systematic risk, variation 
in noise trader sentiment lowers the price of the risky asset j,  and correspond- 
ingly raises the expected return. Note that the expected return on asset j  will 
be higher even if noise traders are neither currently bullish nor bearish (p,,, = 
0), because the systematic risk attached to noise trader activity in asset j re- 
mains. 
The second term in (6)  captures the "price pressure" effect of sentiment. As 
soon as fundamental (or nonfundamental) news gives rise to an increase in 
sentiment, the price of  the stock will jump to reflect not only what rational 
investors think the announcement means for future dividends but also what 
they think the announcement means for current and future demand by ordinary 
investors. From (7),  the model has the property that any variables dated t or 
earlier which are known to reflect current noise trader sentiment will also help 
predict returns. 
8.2.3  Fund Discounts and the Noise Trader Model 
A crucial assumption needed to apply the sentiment model to the pricing of 
publicly traded funds is that publicly traded funds and their underlying assets 
are not subject to the same variation in  noise trader sentiment. One way  to 
rationalize this is to assume that the fund and its underlying assets have differ- 
ent investor clienteles, and that one clientele is subject to swings in sentiment 
and misperceptions while the other is not. In the context of the model presented 
above, we can think of  assets not subject to noise trader sentiment as falling 
within a nontrivial subset of  all risky assets, call it K', where K'  C K. Now 
consider a risky asset j' E K', whose dividend stream is identical to the divi- 
dend stream of another risky asset j E K -  K', but, being in K' is not subject 
to sentiment. Assuming that the fund itself is subject to noise trader sentiment, 
but the underlying assets are not, we can think of asset j as a stylized publicly 
traded fund, and asset j' as the fund's underlying portfolio. From (6)  and (7) 
we derive the price of j' as 354  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
Subtracting p;,f  from p,,,  yields an expression for the discount: 
(9) 
Taking the unconditional mean we are able to express the average discount: 
Equations (9) and (10) embody an “answer” to the closed-end fund puzzle: 
discounts will vary inversely  with sentiment. Assuming  that the underlying 
assets of the fund are not subject to the same variation in sentiment, the dis- 
count on the fund will shrink when noise traders are bullish on the fund. If the 
innovation in noise trader sentiment covaries positively with the innovation in 
total wealth, the covariance terms in equations (9) and (10) will be positive. 
Thus, discounts on the fund may prevail even when noise traders are neither 
currently bearish nor bullish. In section 8.4.1, below, we examine the average 
discount of country funds. 
Because sentiment is not directly observable, the sentiment model per se 
does not generally establish any readily testable implications. However, in the 
context of publicly traded fund pricing, the difference between the price of a 
fund and its NAV can serve as this proxy. Equation (9) suggests that the senti- 
ment attached to each fund J  will be perfectly  correlated with its discount. 
Under the hypothesis that sentiment is attached only to the price of the fund, 
any testable implication that applies to the level of  sentiment equally applies 
to the discount. With this in mind, one implication can be derived from rear- 
ranging (9) and substituting into (7). 
The expected return on the fund is a function of its discount. The relationship 
is positive, so long as  is less than one, that is, as long as sentiment is mean- 
reverting. If  sentiment for a fund drives the discount, then the discount will 
predict  future risk-adjusted  returns.  These issues are examined  in  sections 
8.4.2 and 8.4.3, below 
The difference in the unconditional variance of the fund and the net asset 
returns is given by 
The model predicts that the fund will exhibit more variability than the underly- 
ing assets so long as the shock to fundamentals does not covary excessively 355  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
negatively with the shock to investor sentiment. We  look at this in section 
8.4.4. 
From (6),  the innovation in  wealth is given as a weighted average of  the 
innovations to fundamentals and sentiment: 
Using (12), we can express the covariance term in (9) as 
For the sentiment attached to any risky asset, or fund, j to covary appreciably 
with wealth when K is large, one of two conditions must be imposed on the 
behavior of noise traders. Specifically, either some component of the innova- 
tion in noise trader sentiment on fundj  covaries with the systematic variation 
in fundamentals, so that the first term in (1  3) is nontrivial; or the set of assets 
subject to common variation in noise trader sentiment,  K-K',  is large relative 
to K, so that the second term in  equation (13) is nontrivial. Since publicly 
traded funds make up a small portion of all risky assets, for the second condi- 
tion to hold, the systematic component in the innovation in sentiment must also 
be present in other risky assets besides being present in the funds. These two 
conditions lead to testable implications. First, the innovations in the discounts 
on funds will be correlated with innovations in the systematic component of 
fundamentals. Second, the innovations in the discounts of country funds will 
share a common component across the funds. Third, there will be other risky 
assets, besides the funds, whose prices rise independently of  fundamentals 
when discounts on the funds narrow. A natural candidate for such an asset is 
one whose clientele is the same as the funds. We examine these issues in sec- 
tions 8.4.5 and 8.5.1. 
A specification for the innovations in fund discounts can be derived using 
the difference in returns between the fund and the net assets: 
Equation (14) says that the difference in realized returns between the fund and 
the net assets is due to shocks to investor sentiment. Equation (14) is a useful 
analytic tool in the context of the model because it implies that any variables 
which help to explain (are correlated with) the contemporaneous difference 
between the return on the fund and its assets, after controlling for  the predictive 356  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
power of  the discount, will be variables  correlated with either idiosyncratic 
or systematic variation in noise-trader misperceptions. Empirical versions of 
equation (14) are examined in section 8.5.2. 
8.3  Sample Data and Variable Definitions 
8.3.1  The Sample 
The country  funds  used  in  our empirical  work  consist  of  the thirty-five 
single-country publicly traded funds which were covered in Barron’s publicly 
traded funds column from January 1985 through January 1993, inclusive, and 
for which at least nine months of price data exist within that period. Table 8.1 
provides the names of the country funds along with the date of their respective 
IPOs. Table 8.2 presents some summary statistics on the sample of country 
funds,  and  compares  them  with  similar  statistics for  a  sample of  publicly 
traded domestic-equity funds, as well as a random sample of firms with market 
capitalizations  comparable  to  that  of  the  country  funds.  The  sample  of 
domestic-equity funds is taken from the list of “general equity funds” in Bar- 
ron’s. It includes the oldest and most well known domestic-equity funds. The 
samples of operating firms are random samples drawn from the third and fourth 
market-capitalization quintiles of firms in Standard & Poor’s Industrial Com- 
pustat Tape (the first quintile being the smallest firms). 
The market capitalization of the country funds is on average smaller than 
that of the domestic-equity funds. This reflects, possibly, the older average age 
of the domestic-equity funds. Institutional ownership, measured as the fraction 
of shares owned by institutions, is smaller for the domestic-equity funds than 
for the country funds. However, both types of funds have much lower institu- 
tional ownership than operating firms with comparable levels of market capi- 
talization. A common explanation for the lower participation of institutions in 
publicly traded funds is that institutional portfolio managers would rather not 
have to wony about justifying why they hold another managed fund and thus 
incur two management fees, one implicit and the other explicit. Table 8.2 sug- 
gests that individual investors are the clientele of country funds. 
One difference between country funds and domestic-equity  funds is that 
country funds may invest in stock markets which otherwise restrict interna- 
tional in~estment.~  A government contemplating opening its markets to U.S. 
investors may choose to admit a U.S.-based country fund as a means of limiting 
9. Another difference between country funds and domestic-equity funds is that a host govem- 
ment  may  withhold  taxes  upon  distributions  to country  fund  shareholders.  With  reciprocal 
agreements between the host government and the U.S.  government, the U.S. shareholder will in- 
clude the withheld taxes as a foreign tax credit against U.S. taxes. In the absence of reciprocal 
agreements, however,  the shareholder may  be doubly taxed. The latter may have  the effect of 
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Table 8.1  Sample of Closed-End Country Funds (dates of initial public 
offerings and dates of initial time-series observations) 
Date of  Date of 
Initial Public  Initial Time-Series 
Country Fund (CODE)  Offering (IPO)  Observations 
Austria (AUS)  9-21-89 
Brazil (BE)  3-31-88 
Brazil Equity (BRE)  4-3-92 
Chile (CHL)  9-26-89 
Emerging Germany (EMG)  3-29-90 
Emerging Mexico (EMX)  10-2-90 
First Australia (FAS)  12-12-85 
First Iberian (FIB)  4-3-88 
First Philippine (FPH)  11-8-89 
France Growth (FRG)  5-10-90 
Future Germany (FTG)  2-27-90 
Germany (GER)  7-18-86 
Growth Fund of Spain (GSP)  2-14-90 
Helvetia (Swiss) (SWH)  8-19-87 
India Growth (ING)  8-12-88 
Indonesia (IND)  3-1-90 
Irish Investment (IRE)  3-3-90 
Jakarta Growth (JKG)  4-16-90 
Korea (KOR)  8-22-84 
Malaysia (MLY)  5-8-87 
Mexico (MEX)  6-3-81 
Portugal (PTG)  11-1-89 
Italy (ITL)  2-26-86 
Japan OTC (JPO)  3-14-90 
Korean Investment (KIN)  2- 18-92 
Mexico Equity and Income (MEI)  8-14-90 
New Germany (NGR)  1-24-90 
ROC Taiwan (ROC)  5-19-89 
Singapore (SNG)  7-24-90 
Spain (SPN)  6-21-88 
Taiwan (TAW)  12-23-86 
Thai (THA)  2-17-88 
Thai Capital (THC)  5-22-90 
Turkish Investment (TRK)  12-5-89 
United Kingdom (UKF)  8-6-87 
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such an opening to professional managers buying a fixed amount of shares. 
Typically, a fund is admitted prior to, or instead of, the introduction of Ameri- 
can depository receipts (ADRs) or a full opening. Table 8.2 shows that country 
funds investing in unrestricted  foreign markets tend to have smaller institu- 
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Table 8.2  Market Capitalization and Institutional Holdings of Country Funds” 
Average  Average  Average 
Number of  Market  Number of  Percentage of 
FirmsFunds  Capitalization  Institutional  Shares Held by 
in Sample  ($ million)  Owners  Institutions 
Country funds  35  110.92  18  14 
Unrestricted  21  87.13  16  11 
Restricted  14  146.6  21  18 
Domestic funds  19  402.4  23  6 
Third quintile Cornpustat firms  40  57.13  22  25 
Fourth quintile Cornpustat 
firms  43  236.13  60  40 
Source: Data on market capitalization and institutional holdings is from Standard & Poor’s Stock 
Guide for December 1992. 
“Summary statistics for the sample of thirty-five country funds are compared to a sample of domes- 
tic equity funds and to a sample of operating firms whose average capitalization is comparable to 
the country funds. The sample of domestic equity funds is taken from the list of “general equity 
funds” in Barron’s.  The samples of operating firms are random samples drawn from the third and 
fourth quintiles in  Standard  & Poor’s Industrial Cornpustat Tape, on the basis of total market 
capitalization (first quintile being the smallest firms). See the text for a description of the classifi- 
cation of country funds into the unrestricted and restricted samples. 
investment in their respective equity markets.’O Apparently, an institution can 
justify investing in particular foreign markets, and incurring an additional man- 
agement fee, if the country fund is the only avenue by which such diversifica- 
tion is possible. 
8.3.2  Variable Definitions 
Weekly data on price and reported NAV  of the funds was collected from 
BarronS  and the funds themselves.”  With the exception of the India Growth 
Fund (ING), which is excluded from the regressions in the empirical sections 
below, a complete time series of NAVs was obtained for each of the thirty-five 
funds. BarronS reports either the Friday  or Thursday closing price  in New 
York. The funds compute their reported NAVs by translating the local currency 
price of the assets at the local market close into U.S. dollars. The translation 
to dollars, however, is not uniform as some funds use the exchange rate at the 
local market close, whereas others use an afternoon fix in New York. Since 
foreign markets close on a given day prior to the close in New York, prices and 
NAVs will be only approximately synchronous. Constructed financial returns 
10. Our classifications, “restricted and “unrestricted,” are based on the classification given in 
the International Finance Corporation’s Emerging Markets Handbook. The IFC classifies countries 
into five categories according to their degree of openness: “free,” “relatively free,” “authorized 
investors,” “special classes of shares,” and “closed.” We  placed all countries represented in our 
sample which are not classified as emerging markets in the “unrestricted category, along with 
those classified as ‘‘free” by the IFC. All others were placed in the restricted category. 
11. The integrity of the data was ensured by  checking all outliers and missing observations 
against the data bases kept at the offices of  the fund managers or administrators. 359  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
were adjusted for splits and in-kind distributions using the data in Standard 
and Poor’s Dividend Record.  l2 Table 8.3 provides a description of the variables 
used in the later empirical analysis. 
We compute funds i’s “discount” as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
fund’s net asset value per share (NAV) to its share price (FND). Specifically, 
DISCi,, = In(NAV,,,/FNDi,,>. 
The continuously compounded return on the fund itself, RFNDi,,+I,  and on the 
net assets of the fund, RNAV,,,+,,  are defined as follows: 
where FND,,,+,  and NAV,,,,, are the price and the net asset value (per share) of 
the ith fund at the end of week t  + 1; and DST,,,, is the distribution during 
week t + 1, assumed to take place at the end of the week. Cumulative returns 
for horizons of  four and thirteen weeks are defined by adding the individual 
weekly returns over the relevant horizons. 
Observe that if the dividend distribution is zero or very small, the change in 
the discount, ADISC,.,,, = DISC,  -  DISC,,,,  reflects the difference between 
the continuously compounded weekly return on net assets, RNAV  and the con- 
tinuously compounded weekly return on the fund itself, RFND: ADISC,,,,, = 
RNAV,,,,, -  RFND,,,,,. 
8.4  The Time-Series Behavior of the Discount 
This section investigates the time-series behavior of the discount or pre- 
mium on country funds. We begin with an examination of the average discount 
over the full sample, as well as its behavior during the first six months after the 
initial public offering of the fund. We continue with standard nonstationarity 
tests of country fund discounts, which lead us to examine the predictive power 
12. Pursuant to the Investment Company Act, the funds make two kinds of distributions: an 
income distribution based on portfolio earnings net of expenses, and a capital gains distribution 
based on realized portfolio appreciation. The shareholder is taxed on capital gains distributions at 
his relevant capital gains tax rate. Income distributions are taxed at the regular income tax rate. 
Whereas the Internal Revenue Code requires the funds to distribute at least 98 percent of their 
income in order to avoid an excise tax, the funds may choose to retain capital gains. Most funds 
elect to make capital gains distributions, rather than retain them, because corporate tax rates on 
capital gains exceed individual rates. If the fund does choose to retain portfolio capital gains and 
pay  taxes on them, the taxpaying shareholder can earn a tax  credit equal to  the proportionate 
amount of the share of federal taxes paid by the fund on the shareholder’s behalf and then increase 
the year-end cost basis of the shares by  the retained amount. This is because the shareholder is 
deemed to have reinvested the amount retained by  the fund net of  tax (see Fredman and Scott 
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Table 8.3  Variable Definitions and Construction 
Dollar price of  country fund  i  at the end of  week  f.  All prices are recorded at 
Friday’s market close in New York with the following exceptions: the Brazil (BRZ), 
Brazil Equity (BRE), Emerging Mexico (EMX),  Mexico Equity and Income (MEI), 
Mexico (MEX), Singapore (SNG), and Taiwan (TAW) fund prices are recorded at 
Thursday’s market close; the India Growth Fund (ING) prices are recorded at the 
Wednesday close. If  the reporting day is a New York holiday, the previous day’s 
New York closing prices are used. 
Dollar net asset value of fund i at the end of week t  The NAV  is computed by  the 
fund itself using the local-currency prices of  the underlying  assets recorded  at 
Friday’s local market close and the Friday afternoon fix for exchange rates in New 
York with the following exceptions: the BRZ, BER, EMX, MEI, MEX, SNG, and 
TAW  funds constmct the NAV  using prices at Thursday’s local market close, and 
Thursday afternoon’s New  York exchange rate. The ING fund uses Wednesday’s 
prices and exchange rates. If the reporting day is a New York holiday, the previous 
day’s local closing prices and exchange rates are used. 
ln(EX,,,+,/EX,,,),  the continuously compounded weekly dollar return on holding a 
unit  of  the currency  of  the  country represented  by  fund ,.  EX,,t represents  the 
exchange rate at 3:OO  P.M. in New York (expressed in dollars per foreign currency 
unit) at the end of week r,  where the day marking the end of  the week matches the 
day on which FND,,,  and NAY,, are recorded. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York for the currencies of Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (all bids). Remaining exchange rates 
come from Banque de Generale through Data Resources (DRI), and reflect the 
middle of the bid-ask spread. 
In(FST,,+,/FST,,),  the weekly return (excluding dividends) on the host country’s 
aggregate stock market in local currency units. FST,,  is the host country’s aggregate 
stock market price index in local currency at the end of week r,  matching the day 
that FND and NAV  are recorded. Source: Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) through DRI. 
ln(SP500,,,/SP500,), the weekly return on the Standard and Poor’s 500 (excluding 
dividends), computed separately for each fund to match the same calendar horizon 
as RFND and RNAV. Source: DRI. 
ln(R2000,+,/R2000,), the  weekly  return  on  the  Russell-2000  index  of  small 
capitalization stocks (excluding dividends), computed separately for each fund to 
match the same calendar horizon as RFND and RNAV. Source: DRI. 
In(WORLD,,,/WORLD,), the weekly return on the world stock market in dollars 
(excluding dividends),  computed  separately  for  each  fund  to  match  the  same 
calendar horizon as RFND and RNAV. Source: MSCI through DRI. 
of the discounts. Finally, we present evidence that, consistent with the predic- 
tions of the noise-trading model, a large fraction of the variation in individual 
country fund discounts is common across the funds. 
8.4.1 
The first column of Table 8.4 presents the cross-sectional average of time- 
series means of  the discount of  all thirty-five funds over the sample period. 
Average Discounts and Aftermarket Performance of Country Funds Table 8.4  Post-OtTering Price Performance and Average Premium/Discount(-) of Country Funds" 
Average  Mean 
Premium/  Underwriter's 
Discount  Premium 
Country funds  -0.031  0.0755 
Unrestricted  -0.067  0.0767 
Restricted  0.020  0.0737 
(35)  (0.025) 
(21)  (0.019) 


















































(not including weeks 
0 to + 24)  +  24 
-0.070  -0.056 
(0.045)  (0.022) 
-0.139  -0.091 
(0.021)  (0.019) 
0.068  -0.007 
(0.047)  (0.044) 
"The table reports the cross-sectional means and standard errors of the premium/discount on the first date for which the fund reports a net asset value 
and at subsequent four-week intervals. In all but two cases (MEX and KOR) the first NAV observation date corresponds to the first sample observa- 
tion reported in table 8.1. The first NAV observation date usually follows the IPO by two to three weeks. The table applies the convention that premia 
are denoted as positive while discounts are denoted as negative. See the text for a description of the classification of unrestricted and restricted funds. 362  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
Although the average discount is not significantly different from zero, separat- 
ing the funds into those pertaining to countries with restricted and unrestricted 
equity markets reveals a difference between the two groups. The average dis- 
count on funds whose host markets are unrestricted is almost 7 percent and 
significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 3.53), while the average discount 
on funds associated with restricted host markets is not significant. This evi- 
dence is consistent with theoretical models illustrating that international in- 
vestment barriers can cause prices of assets of equal risk to differ across coun- 
tries. All else equal, a binding restriction will raise the price-NAV ratio above 
the level prevailing in the absence of such restrictions (Ermnza and Losq 1985; 
Eun and Janakiramanan 1986).13 
Table 8.4 also examines the aftermarket pelformance  of the country funds 
relative to their underlying assets. One prediction of the noise-trading model 
is that a new fund will be issued only when sentiment for the fund is high. 
After an IPO, the fund’s organizers invest the proceeds, net of underwriting 
fees, in accordance with the fund’s investment objective. Because the amount 
of the offering exceeds the proceeds which constitute the initial NAV  of the 
fund, the fund is issued at a premium. This premium is a derivative of the 
underwriting fees and start-up costs. A successful offering implies that some 
investors are willing to pay a premium for the cash that the fund is holding 
after the offering. The fact that some investors are willing to pay a premium 
can also be taken as evidence of bullish noise trader sentiment for a country. 
Naturally, organizers will try to time issuance to coincide with this bullishness. 
If the noise-trading story is true and sentiment is mean-reverting, following an 
IPO the original high premium  ought to deteriorate. A deterioration would 
occur even if, with cross-border restrictions, the average discount is small or if 
on average a premium prevails. Table 8.4 confirms these predictions. 
Table 8.4 shows that country funds are issued with an underwriter’s premium 
of  about 7.5 percent. Market premia  appear to be larger, however. Our first 
NAV data are available on average about two weeks after the IPO. They show 
that funds associated with restricted markets trade, at that time, at premia of 
almost 25 percent whereas funds associated with unrestricted markets trade at 
a premium of roughly 7.4 percent. Following the first price-NAV observation, 
the premia begin to erode. After twenty-four weeks, the premium on restricted 
funds falls to 6.8 percent from the original 24.4 percent, and the premium on 
unrestricted funds becomes -  13.9 percent (a discount) from the original 7.4 
percent. Recall that the change in the premium can be approximately interpre- 
ted as the difference between the cumulative returns on the fund and on the 
NAV.  Accordingly,  investors who buy  an unrestricted  country’s fund in  the 
13. Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1990) demonstrate that a relation exists for all 
but one of  the five countries examined, between announcements of changes in investment restric- 
tions and changes in discounts and premia. Bonser-Neal et al. confirm, however, that changes in 
cross-border restrictions are unable to account for much, if not all, of the time-variation in dis- 
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immediate aftermarket and sell it twenty-four weeks later experience a nega- 
tive return of 21.3 percent relative to the NAV,  while holders of  a restricted 
country’s fund experience a loss of 17.6 percent relative to the NAV. Assuming 
cross-sectional independence, both of these average cumulative returns are sig- 
nificantly different from zero. Moreover, a nonparametric U-test does not re- 
ject the hypothesis that the average twenty-four-week returns are the same 
across the two groups of  fundsL4  Finally, the last column of  table 8.4 shows 
that if the first twenty-four weeks are omitted from each fund’s time series, the 
average discount for the full sample is almost 6 percent and significant, while 
the average discount for the unrestricted sample is 9 percent and also signifi- 
cant. The evidence presented in table 8.4 suggests that after taking account of 
the effects of cross-border restrictions, the aftermarket performance of country 
funds adheres to the stylized facts derived for the domestic equity funds: in the 
long run a discount prevails. 
8.4.2  Stationarity Tests’* 
If  all publicly traded funds are ultimately liquidated, discounts are in the 
long run stationary. Over short time intervals, however, discounts could be non- 
stationary. Discount stationarity is relevant in the context of the noise-trader 
model because the discount reflects the sentiment attached to a particular coun- 
try fund. If sentiment is mean-reverting, and variation in sentiment drives the 
discount, then discounts should also be mean-reverting. Alternatively, if under 
cross-border segmentation, variation in discounts is driven by changes in the 
ratio of the domestic price of risk to the foreign price of risk, then the price of 
a fund might have  no inherent tendency to revert to the market price of  the 
underlying assets, and the discount could be nonstationary. 
To  test the hypothesis of  nonstationarity, we  employ Stock and Watson’s 
(1988) unit root test twice, for the model with and without a time trend. We 
also perform the test using either one or eight autoregressive lags. Table  8.5 
presents the results. The hypothesis of nonstationarity is rejected for most of 
the country funds. When the number of autoregressive  lags is one, the hypothe- 
sis is rejected at the 10 percent level for twenty-three funds in the model with 
a time trend, and for twenty-three funds in the model without a time trend. 
14. Weiss (1989) examines aftermarket prices of both domestic- and foreign-equity fund IPOs. 
Although she finds that the mean premium for a sample of  foreign stock funds (country funds and 
internationally diversified funds) is significantly negative (- 11.42 percent) six months following 
an IPO, unlike the domestic-equity funds examined, the cumulative returns on the international 
funds over six months are not statistically different from zero. Because Weiss evaluates an earlier 
period (1985-87), her sample of  fifteen foreign funds is relatively small, and this may explain her 
negative results. Peavey (1990) examines IPOs and aftermarket performance of publicly traded 
funds between 1986 and 1987, including five country funds. His tests make no reference to fund 
returns relative to NAV  returns, yet he finds that T-bill- and market-adjusted returns are signifi- 
cantly negative in the aftermarket. 
15. The tests in this section, as well as the regressions and tests in the rest of the paper, exclude 
the India Growth Fund (ING). We were unable to obtain an unbroken time series of NAVs  for 
this fund. Table 8.5  Tests of the Nonstationarity of Country Fund Discounts” 
Stock-Watson Test Statistic 
Autoregressive Corrections = 1  Autoregressive Corrections = 8 
Time-Series  Time-Trend  Not Time-Trend  Time-Trend  Not Time-Trend 
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-3.49*** 



















at the 10%  23/34  23/34  20134  16/34 
level  68%  68%  59%  47 % 
“The  table reports the results from applying Stock and Watson’s (1988) unit-root test (for a univari- 
ate time-series) to the country fund discount data. The test requires first transforming each fund’s 
discount by taking first differences. The first-differenced series are then passed through two sepa- 
rate filters. The first filter removes autoregressive dependence of order l or 8 (the “autocorrelation 365  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
Table 8.5  (continued) 
correction”) as well as a time trend. The second filter makes the autocorrelation correction of order 
1 or 8 but does nor remove the time trend. Each filtered series FALIISC,, is then regressed on the 
lagged value of the discount: 
FALIISC,, = -bPISC,,_, -t e8,,. 
The table reports (for each fund) the test statistics associated with the null hypothesis that b, is less 
than or equal to zero (a unit root). The test statistics are distributed under the null according to the 
empirical distributions given in Stock and Watson 1988. 
*Test statistic is significant at  the 10 percent level. **Test statistic is significant at the 5 percent 
level. ***Test statistic is significant at the 1 percent level. 
When the number of autoregressive lags is eight, the hypothesis is rejected for 
twenty funds in the model with a time trend, and for sixteen funds in the model 
without. Assuming independence across the funds, and using the normal ap- 
proximation to the binomial distribution, one can compute the probability that 
the above results were generated under the null hypothesis that all fund dis- 
counts are nonstationary. In all four cases, rejections occur at the 1 percent 
significance level. 
In some funds, the hypothesis of  nonstationarity is not rejected. In  these 
exceptional cases, however, changes in the ratio of  foreign to domestic price 
of risk in the context of cross-border investment restrictions are unlikely to be 
responsible for the failure to reject nonstationarity. Examination of  table 8.5 
reveals no  special pattern across the restricted and unrestricted funds. The 
Emerging Mexico (EMG, First Philippine (FPH), Indonesia (IND), Mexico 
(MEX), Mexico Income and  Equity  (MEI),  Taiwan (TAW),  ROC Taiwan 
(ROC), Thai (THA), and Thai Capital (THC) funds generally reject nonsta- 
tionarity of  discounts even though they are associated with restricted capital 
markets. Meanwhile, the Austria (AUS), Japan OTC (JPO), Singapore (SNG), 
and Spain (SPN) funds fail to reject nonstationarity even though they invest in 
largely unrestricted markets. 
The median first-order autoregressive coefficient across the thirty-five dis- 
counts of the country funds is 0.887, implying that an innovation in the dis- 
count has a half-life of roughly five weeks. Similarly, the average correlation 
between consecutive weekly discounts is approximately 0.854, implying that 
the first-order autoregressive  process can explain about 73 percent of discount 
variation. The correlation at four weeks is 0.57 (R2  = 0.32), and is substantially 
less than the one-month correlation (0.85) found by Pontiff (1991) using Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler’s domestic-equity fund data. 
8.4.3  Do Fund Returns Vary Excessively? 
Sharpe and Sosin (1975), using quarterly data from 1966 to 1973 on eight 
domestic funds, find that the unconditional variance of  the median fund’s re- 
turn is 36 percent greater than the variance of its net asset value return. Pontiff 366  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
(1991), using Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler’s data set, finds that return volatility is 
73 percent greater than the volatility of the fund’s assets. The relative variance 
of returns on the funds is important because it addresses the issue of excess 
volatility that noise traders, through the mechanism of public trading, may in- 
duce in the prices of traded assets. The fund’s return is excessively volatile if 
Var(RFND) > Var(RNAV), or Var(ADISC) -  2Cov(ADISC,RNAV) > 0. Fol- 
lowing Pontiff (1991), to reduce skewness we computed the log variance ratio 
on each of the thirty-five country funds as the natural log of the ratio of the 
variance of the fund’s return to the variance of  the return on its assets. This 
ratio will be zero if the variance of a fund’s return is equal to the variance of 
the NAV return. For our sample of funds we found the mean log variance to 
be 1.17 (standard error = 0.57). The median ratio is 1.135, implying that for 
the median  fund (UKF), the variance of its return is more than three times 
greater than the variance of its net asset return. It is unlikely that a variance 
ratio of this magnitude could be attributable to bias in the variance estimates 
deriving from bid-ask spread bias. 
8.4.4 
Mean reversion in  the discounts,  as demonstrated above, implies that the 
discount of  a given country fund can predict a subsequent change in the dis- 
count. Moreover, since the change in a discount reflects (approximately)  the 
difference between  the returns on the fund and its assets, a larger premium 
predicts either (a) a smaller subsequent cumulative return on the fund, or (b) a 
larger cumulative return on the fund’s assets, or (c) both a smaller return on 
the fund and a larger return on the NAV.  In the context of  the noise-trader 
model, the first case occurs when sentiment affects only the price of the fund, 
and the fund premium is perfectly positively correlated with that sentiment. In 
the second case, sentiment affects only the underlying assets, and the premium 
on the fund price is perfectly negatively correlated with that sentiment. In the 
third case, both the fund and the underlying assets are subject to sentiment, and 
the discount is a noisy measure of both sentiment on the fund and sentiment on 
the underlying  assets. Thus, although from the level of the discount we can 
infer only the differential in sentiment between the country-fund and foreign- 
market clienteles, the power of the discount in predicting fund returns (relative 
to its predictive power for the NAV returns) can be taken as an indication of 
the extent to which sentiment affects only the fund price. 
The empirical  literature on domestic-equity  funds upholds  that  deep dis- 
counts are indicative of positive risk-adjusted returns.  l6 Although this empiri- 
cal relation is well established for domestic-equity funds and has become pop- 
The Predictive Power of Discounts 
16. Thompson (1978). using a sample of twenty-three (primarily NYSE) domestic-equity funds 
traded between 1940 and 1975, demonstrates that risk-adjusted returns on portfolios of discounted 
fund shares outperformed the market. Richards, Fraser, and Groth (1980) and Anderson (1986), 
using a sample of diversified and specialized domestic-equity funds, derive optimal trading rules 
for earning excess rates of return. 367  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
ularized  (Malkiel  1990),  to  our  knowledge  no  one  has  examined  these 
empirical relations for country funds.I7 To  examine the predictive  power of 
country fund discounts we ran regressions of the form 
N 
RFNDl+,,  = $+g  DISC,,,+<, 
n=l  (15) 
RNAV,,,, = a;+ppIsct,l+e;l, 
n=  I 
where the a,  and p, are fund-specific intercepts and slope coefficients and N 
denotes the cumulative return hoizon. In table 8.6, we report the estimates of 
g  and pp, as well as the adjusted R2,  for regressions using cumulative return 
horizons of one, four, and thirteen weeks. Panel A in table 8.6 shows that an 
increase in the discount is generally associated with a subsequent increase in 
the fund's return. As the return horizon increases from one week to thirteen 
weeks, the reversal in the fund price becomes progressively stronger, generat- 
ing a larger regression coefficient between the cumulative return on the fund 
and the discount. Evidently, bid-ask bias or other measurement errors cannot 
account for the price reversal.'* The average adjusted R2s  of the regressions are 
0.053 for the one-week return horizon, 0.106 for the four-week horizon, and 
0.179 for the thirteen-week horizon. The strong predictability of fund returns 
supports the hypothesis that sentiment is a component of the price of the fund. 
High discounts are less successful at predicting low NAV returns. Few re- 
gression coefficients are negative and significant in panel B of table 8.6 and 
the R2s are much lower, on average, than in panel A. The average adjusted R2s 
are 0.007, 0.031, and 0.084 for the one-, four-, and thirteen-week horizons, 
respectively. Nonetheless, most regression coefficients in panel B are negative, 
and for five funds (AUS, IND, JKG, ROC, TAW) the regression  coefficients 
are generally negative and significant. Occasionally, therefore, discounts con- 
tain  some information  about future net asset value returns, implying that a 
small component  of  the discount reflects  the sentiment of  foreign investors 
which affects the price of the underlying assets. That is, the price of the fund 
captures fundamental information not captured by the NAV. 
8.4.5  Is There a Common Component in Country Fund Discounts? 
So far, we have analyzed individual country funds in isolation. We now ex- 
amine comovement in country fund discounts. The noise-trader model sug- 
17. Some commentators have argued that a country fund with a large premium may reflect the 
underpricing of the underlying assets due to unwarranted bearishness by  the local investors. For 
example, see the discussion in  Fredman and Scott (1991) concerning the views of Jon Woronoff 
in the International Fund Monitor; June 1990. 
18. For the equations describing the thirteen-week cumulative returns on the country funds, we 
find that the coefficient on the discount is positive and significant at the 10 percent level or  less for 
twenty-seven (79 percent) of the country funds. Using the normal approximation to the binomial 
distribution, and assuming cross-sectional independence, this result is associated with a p-value 
of less than  I  percent under the null hypothesis that no positive association exists between dis- 
counts and future returns on the fund. Table 8.6  The Predictive Power of Country Fund Discounts" 
A. Cumulative Return on the Fund Is Regressed on the Discount 
Return Horizon =  Return Horizon =  Return Horizon = 
1 week  4 weeks  13 weeks 























































































































































































































































0.135  0.05  0.336  0.11  0.667  0.18 Table 8.6  (continued) 
B. Cumulative Return on the Net Asset Value Is Regressed on the Discount 
Return Horizon =  Return Horizon =  Return Horizon = 
1 week  4 weeks  13 weeks 





































-0.060**  *  0.06 
-0.026  0.00 
-0.002  -0.02 
0.016  -0.00 
-0.078  0.01 
0.030  -0.00 
-0.037  0.01 
0.005  -0.00 
-0.001  -0.01 
0.039  -0.00 
-0.027  -0.00 
-0.022  0.01 
0.020  -0.01 
-0.016  -0.00 
-0.046**  0.04 
-0.006  -0.01 
-0.017  0.00 
-0.03  1  0.02 
-0.054*  0.03 
-0.009  0.00 
-0.063  0.02 
0.001  -0.00 
0.054*  0.02 
-0.016  -0.00 
-0.028  0.00 
-0.013  -0.00 
-0.053**  0.02 
0.002  -0.01 
-0.004  -0.00 
-0.044***  0.06 
-0.016  0.00 
-0.050  0.00 
-0.034  0.00 
0.003  -0.00 













































































































































-0.017  0.01  -0.031  0.03  -0.039  0.08 
"Results from the following regressions are presented: 
Panel A: 
N  c  RFND8,,+n  = 4 -t IYDISC,, + e,, 
n=l 
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Table 8.6  (continued) 
Panel B: 
where RFND, and RNAV] are the returns on fund , and on the net assets of fund ,,  respectively, 
DISC,, is the discount on the ifh country fund at the end of week r.  at  and p, are fund-specific 
parameters. The regressions are generated for cumulative return horizons of one, four, and thirteen 
weeks (N = 1.4, 13). Test statistics are based on standard errors corrected for conditional hetero- 
scedasticity (N = 1) and for autocorrelation of order N- 1 (N =  4, 13) using the methods in White 
1980 and Newey and West 1987, respectively. 
*indicates significance at the  10 percent level. **indicates significance at the  5  percent  level. 
***indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
gests that persistent discounts across country funds imply that fund discounts 
may be subject to a common (systematic) source of risk. If U.S. investors act 
on general bullish and bearish sentiment which affects all country funds, their 
behavior is likely to affect country fund prices systematically, resulting in a 
common component across the fund discounts.  l9 
To capture a possible common component across the fund discounts, we 
estimate a  parametric version  of  the  “single index” models  discussed by 
Sargent and Sims (1977). Estimation of the unobserved component model pro- 
vides a succinct test of  the presence of  a common component across funds 
as well as a convenient tool for analysis. The empirical model is as follows. 
Each discount DISC,,, is hypothesized to move  contemporaneously with  an 
unobserved scalar (“index”), 2,  which is common to all funds, and an idiosyn- 
cratic component E,,,. Both the unobserved index and the idiosyncratic compo- 
nent of each fund’s discount are modeled as having linear stochastic structures. 
In  addition, 2, is assumed only to enter each fund’s discount contemporane- 
ously. The formulation is 
DISC,,,  = Biz,  + u,,; 
(16) 
a(L)Z,  = e,; S,(L)  u,,,= v,,,  i = 1, . . ., K, 
where a(L)  and S(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L, e, and v,  are white 
noise errors, and K  represents the number of assets. The main identifying as- 
sumption of the model expresses the notion that comovements in the multiple 
discounts arise from a single source Z,.  This is formalized by assuming that the 
terms u, ,, i = 1, . . . ,  K,  and the term Z are mutually uncorrelated at all leads 
and lags. 
Because estimation of the model requires exactly overlapping time-series of 
19. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) examine the comovements in discounts by  computing the 
painvise correlations across ten funds using monthly data over a period of  twenty years.  They 
conclude that correlations are high enough to  suggest that the discounts of different domestic 
funds move together. 371  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
fund discounts, we choose the estimation period in order to balance the need 
for a long weekly time series and the need to include many and diverse funds. 
We  restricted the sample to include the nine oldest funds (MEX, FAS, GER, 
SWH, ITL,  KOR, MLY,  TAW, and UKF) over the period January 1988  to Janu- 
ary 1993. We  estimate the model by first casting it into a (vector) state-space 
form and then applying the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function.zo 
To simplify estimation, we further assume that a(L)  and 6(L)  represent first- 
order polynomials. In addition, we normalize the variance of the innovation in 
the common factor, v,,  to equal 12' 
The results from estimating the unobserved components model are given in 
table 8.7, panel A. Several features are worth noting. First, seven of the nine 
slope coefficients, B,  that relate the common factor to the discount of  each 
country fund, are significant, while two are marginally significant. Further- 
more, the estimate of the autoregressive coefficient of the common component, 
a,  is 0.96 (standard error = 0.03). This implies a level of persistence of  the 
common component (half-life = seventeen weeks) considerably greater than 
the persistence of the idiosyncratic  components implied by the estimates of the 
6,  whose median value is 0.78 (half-life = three weeks). A likelihood ratio test 
of the hypothesis that there is no common factor, that is, that the B, and a  are 
all jointly zero, strongly rejects: ~~(10)  = 131.4;~-value  = 0.00. Based on the 
estimates of the slope coefficients (B,),  the estimates of the autoregressive pa- 
rameters (a  and  Si), and the estimates of  the variances of  the idiosyncratic 
errors, we computed for each of the nine funds the fraction of the unconditional 
variance of the discount attributable to the common factor. We  found that on 
average, the variance in the common factor accounts for roughly 20 percent of 
the variance in the discounts (last column, panel A). 
Inspection of the errors generated by the model estimated above reveals se- 
rial correlation  in the residuals. In other words, specifying AR( 1) processes for 
the common and idiosyncratic components is not general enough to fully cap- 
ture the dynamic behavior of discounts. Checking the robustness of our results 
to  a  higher-order  dynamic specification  could  be  done,  in  principle,  by 
allowing more lags in the factor dynamics. However, this turns out to be com- 
putationally costly. Instead, we applied the Kalman filter to prewhitened dis- 
20. The Kalman filter is a well-known way to compute the Gaussian likelihood function. The 
filter recursively constructs minimum mean-square-error  estimates of the unobserved state vector, 
given observations of the measurable variables. This has two parts: the transition equation and the 
measurement equations. The transition equation describes the evolution of the unobserved state 
variables, Z, and ui,,, and their respective lags. The measurement equation relates the observed 
variables to the state variable. 
21. A specification  test for the model was also conducted (Sargent and Sims 1977).  Specifically, 
we test the restriction that all comovements in the series arise from a single source against the 
alternative  that they have an unrestricted covariance  matrix. The test examines the implication that 
the spectral density matrix of the vector DISC,, constructed by arranging the fund discounts into 
a Kxl vector, has a factor structure. We perform the test by partitioning the cross-spectrum into 
five equally spaced frequency bands. The x2  statistic has 275 degrees of  freedom and equals 
130.65 with ap-value of 0.99. This provides little evidence against the restrictions. Table 8.7  Estimation of an Unobserved Components Model of 
Country Fund Discounts" 
A. The estimate of a,  the autoregressive parameter for the common factor Z,, was estimated to be 
0.96 (standard error 0.031). The parameters pertaining to the individual funds were estimated as 
follows: 
Parameter  Contribution of 
Variance of Z to Variance 





































AVG  0.0088  0.78  0.195 
B. 
Fund 
Parameter  Contribution of 
Variance of Z to Variance 





































AVG  0.028  0.066  0.171 
"Results from estimating the following models are presented: 
Panel A: 
DISC,,, =  B,  Z, + u~,,;  Z, = a  Z,-, + e, ;  u,,, =  &I  u8  ,,-,  + v,,, ;  i = 1  ,...,  K 
Panel B: 
A,(L)  DISC,,,  = B, Z, + uc,,;  Z, = e, ;  u~,,  =  v,,,;  i = I,  ...,  K 
where e, and v,,,  are normally distributed white noise errors, Z represents the common component 
in discount variation, u,,,,  is the idiosyncratic component of the discount of country fund,  i,  L is the 
lag operator, and a  and 8, are autoregressive parameters to be estimated. Each of the two models 
is estimated with nine country funds (K = 9) using weekly discount data over the period January 
1988 through January  1993. The models are estimated by  casting them in a vector state-space 
form and applying the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood functions. In  the second model 373  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
Table 8.7  (continued) 
(panel B), the discounts for the funds are each filtered through (A&),  a polynomial in L,  to “pre- 
whiten” the data. The choice of Ac  for i = I,  ...,  K, is described in the text. In each case, the variance 
of e,  is normalized to 1, while u(vJ, the standard error of v,,  is an estimable parameter. 
*indicates significance at the  10 percent  level. **indicates significance at  the 5 percent level. 
***indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
counts for the nine country funds under consideration and tested for a common 
component in the innovation in the country fund discounts. Formally, we re- 
placed DZSC,,  in the formulation above, with A,(L)DZSC,,,  (for i = 1, . . . ,  K) 
and forced the Z, and ui,,  to be white noise. A,(L)  is a polynomial in the lag 
operator which “whitens” the discounts.22 
Results from estimating the model using the prewhitened data are in panel 
B of  table 8.7. The estimates of  the Bi, the exposure of  the fund discounts 
to the common innovation, are now highly significant for all nine funds. The 
likelihood ratio test of  the hypothesis that there is no common disturbance 
strongly rejects (~~(9)  = 140.6; p-value = O.OO),  and simple diagnostic tests 
on the errors generated by  the model reveal no evidence of serial correlation. 
The average estimate of the contribution of the common factor to the variances 
of the country fund discounts remains roughly 17 percent. Overall, the results 
presented in table 8.7 provide strong evidence of common variation across the 
fund discounts. 
Further insight into the results can be gained by examining the behavior of 
the unobservable common factor during the sample period. A plot of Z,, gener- 
ated from the first model, is presented in figure 8.3. Because the variance of 
the innovation in Z, is normalized to  1, the reader should focus on relative 
changes instead of the level. The most noticeable feature of the common factor 
is its behavior in late 1989, which coincides with the fall of the Berlin Wall.23 
Although the noise-trader model does not explicitly specify any one source of 
investor misperception or sentiment, Shiller (1984) discusses one characteriza- 
tion of sentiment as a change in investors’ attitude toward future returns, which 
may occur as an arbitrary social reaction to some widely noted events. In the 
introduction, we noted that the fall of the Berlin Wall might qualify as such 
an event. The analysis of this subsection seems to confirm that the event was 
associated with an innovation in the unobserved common component in the 
discount across the country funds. Compared with the sentiment model, initial 
public offerings of country funds shown in figure 8.1 peaked in  1990.24 
22. To prewhiten the discount data, autoregressions of orders one through twelve were run. The 
order of the process was selected so that it minimized the maximum deviation from the cumulative 
spectrum of a white noise process. 
23. Excluding the Germany Fund from the above procedures does not lead to a significant 
change in the test results or in the series plotted in figure 8.3. 
24. During the 1980s, offerings of  domestic-equity funds peaked in 1986 and 1987, prior to the 
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Fig. 8.3  Common component in country fund premiddiscounts 
8.5  Sources of Variation in Country Fund Discounts 
Although widely noted events may account for some large coherent swings 
in sentiment, casual observation suggests that they cannot account for all of 
the variation in the discounts of country funds. In this section we examine the 
response of  fund prices to specific aggregate financial variables such as the 
exchange rate, the index of the host country's stock prices, an index of world 
stock prices, and indices of stock prices for large- and small-capitalization U.S. 
firms. Our aim is to explore potential sources of the variation in fund discounts 
that we  documented in earlier sections, and to examine whether or not the 
noise-trader model can accommodate some of  the evidence we uncover. In 
order to shed some light on the ability of  models with rational agents and 
investment restrictions to explain the time-variation in discounts, we also per- 
form the empirical analysis separately for funds whose host countries restrict 
international investment from funds whose host countries allow free capital 
movements. We also examine the differences between host countries with de- 
veloped stock markets and those with emerging stock markets and between 
Asian, European, and Latin American funds. 
8.5.1  Specification 
For each country fund i we estimate basic regression equations of the form 
N 375  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
where RET denotes alternatively the weekly return on the country fund, RFND, 
the weekly  return  on the NAV,  RNAV  and the excess return  on the country 
fund, RFND -  RNAK  DISC is the country fund discount, and is observed at 
the beginning of the holding period prior to the realization  of the cumulative 
return  ERET. Hence, the equation is an extension of  the earlier forecasting 
equations of section 8.4. The X,s are weekly returns of different financial vari- 
ables  observed  simultaneously  with  the  dependent  variable.  N  denotes  the 
holding period horizon in weeks. As before, we show results for N = one, four, 
and thirteen weeks. 
When the dependent  variable is RFND -  RNAV  the above equation  be- 
comes the empirical counterpart of equation (14) of the sentiment model. In 
this framework, DISC captures the level of  sentiment in the beginning of the 
holding period, while the remaining independent variables capture the influ- 
ence of innovations  in sentiment during the holding period. Being financial 
rates of return, the X, variables are nearly serially uncorrelated and thus may 
readily capture innovations in sentiment. 
The first financial variable  that we use as an explanatory variable  in the 
regression  is fund-specific  and represents  the cumulative return  on a broad 
index of stocks from fund i’s host country, RFST. RFST is included to capture 
the component of returns that are attributed to local currency variation in the 
host country’s stock market.  The second variable, REX, is the weekly dollar 
return on holding the foreign country’s currency. Changes in the value of the 
dollar relative to the foreign currency result in an unambiguous change in the 
dollar value of the fundamental. While small exchange rate movements that 
are perceived by the market as temporary may not affect the fund price and 
thus may move the discount/premium,  large changes in the dollar value of for- 
eign currency ought to move the price of the fund sufficiently in order to leave 
the  discount/premium  unaffected.  Nonetheless,  casual  observation  of  the 
events of September 1992 suggest otherwise. This month saw an appreciation 
of  the dollar as speculators bet against certain weak European currencies in 
anticipation of the withdrawals from the ERM, which did occur. The resultant 
appreciation of the dollar was associated with significant drops in the premia 
of the European country funds: as the NAV (translated to dollars) fell, the price 
of the funds generally did not. 
Our earlier empirical analysis showed that country fund discounts shared a 
common  component.  We  now  include  three  explanatory  variables  that  are 
common to all country funds in order to capture some of this common varia- 
tion. The first of these variables, RWRD, is the dollar return on a world stock 
market index. The next variable, RSP, is the dollar return on an index of large 
U.S. stocks. The last variable RSML -  RSP, represents the excess return on an 
index of small-capitalization U.S.  stocks over the return on the large stocks. 
Under Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler’s (1991) assertion that noise trader sentiment 
is  associated  with  individual  investors,  and thus  largely  affects  small-cap 
stocks, an index of large U.S. stocks is more apt to capture variation in U.S. 376  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
fundamentals, while the excess return on small caps will capture variation 
in noise trader sentiment. Detailed definitions of  all variables are given in 
table 8.3. 
8.5.2  Results 
Table 8.8A presents the main results. In order to abstract from unnecessary 
details, the table presents only summary results for all funds from stacked re- 
gressions. The stacked regressions restrict the slope coefficients to be the same 
across funds but allow individual fund intercepts. In addition to the multivari- 
ate regression described above, table 8.8A also provides results from univariate 
regressions in which the cumulative returns ERFND, =NAY  and ERFND 
-  DNAVare separately regressed on each of the independent variables. Panel 
A of  table 8.8A reports the results for the one-week holding-period horizon, 
panel B the four-week horizon, and panel C the thirteen-week 
The fund discount has strong explanatory power for fund returns (DFND) 
in both the multivariate and univariate regressions. As already noted in the 
earlier sections, high discounts are associated with positive future returns on 
the fund but negative future returns on the net assets. As a result, the associa- 
tion with excess fund returns, DFND -  XRNAY  is even stronger. Observe 
also that as the holding period horizon increases, the absolute size of  the p, 
coefficients also increases. There is strong reversion of the fund price toward 
the NAV, as well as a smaller but statistically significant reversion of the NAV 
toward the fund price. A relative fall of the fund price-that  is, an increase in 
the discount-by  100 basis points is followed by an increase in the fund price 
and a decrease in the NAV. The multivariate regression shows that after thirteen 
weeks the fund price has increased by  37.5 basis points and the NAV has fallen 
by  6.4 basis points, thus 44 of  the original 100-basis-points gap have  been 
eliminated. 
Turning  to  the  response  of  country fund  prices  to  local  stock returns, 
ERFS2: country fund returns themselves have  significantly lower betas than 
do the NAV returns. The average local market beta for the NAV return (fund 
return) is 0.608 (0.428) for the one-week return horizon and 0.718 (0.600) for 
the thirteen-week horizon.26  These observed differences between the fund and 
25. The Newey-West t-statistics of  panels B and C treat the stacked data as a single time-series, 
that is, they do not recognize the break in the stacked data between two separate funds. This fact 
is likely to bias the reported t-statistics slightly downward. 
26. It is interesting to note that the beta of the underlying assets (NAV) with the local market is 
significantly less than one in the multivariate regressions that control for exchange-rate changes. 
This potentially reflects one of two things. First, the foreign equity holdings of the funds may 
indeed be less “risky” than the foreign market. By holding a disproportionate amount of small 
firms, the fund reduces its exposure to a foreign market index that may be dominated by two or 
three large firms (Mexico is well-known example). Second, a country fund is never 100 percent 
fully invested in the foreign-equity market it represents, especially if  the fund is new  and still 
holds  a large portion of  the IPO proceeds  as cash. In general, the funds NAV  may  represent 
nonequity assets such as local and dollar-denominated time deposits and repurchase agreements, 
tax refunds, interest receivable, and currency options. Table 8.8A  Country Fund Return-Generating  Equations’ 
A. Cumulative Return Horizon Is One Week (N  = 1) 
Multivariate Regression-Slope  Coefficients and t-statistics 
Dependent  Number of 
Variable  DISC  DFST  CREX  DWRD  USP  CRSML-DSP  AdjustedR2  Observations 
CRnvD  0.059  0.428  0.088  0.500  0.377  0.285  0.26  6469 
DWAV  -0.009  0.608  0.621  0.153  -0.017  0.070  0.63  6469 
ERFND-ERN  AV  0.069  -0.180  -0.533  0.344  0.394  0.215  0.11  6469 
(10.1)  (21.3)  (1.96)  (10.5)  (7.26)  (5.48) 
(-2.89)  (24.9)  (13.0)  (6.42)  (-0.75)  (2.51) 
(10.6)  (-6.44)  (-8.53)  (6.99)  (7.22)  (3.79) 
Univariate Regressions-Slope  Coefficients, t-statistics, 
and Adjusted Rz 
Dependent 
Variable  DISC  CRFST  DEX  DWRD  Dsp  DSML 
ZRFND  0.053 
(8.93) 
I0.021 
CRNAV  -0.021 
(-5.35) 
[0.01] 
















































(12.4) Table 8.8A  (continued) 
B. Cumulative Return Horizon Is Four Weeks (N = 4) 
Multivariate  Regression-Slope  Coefficients and r-statistics 
Dependent  Number of 
Variable  DISC  CRFST  DEX  DWRD  DSP  ERSML-USP  Adjusted R2  Observations 
CRFND  0.155  0.557  0.470  0.584  0.118  0.347  0.46  6367 
CRNAV  -0.028  0.697  0.700  0.1 11  0.020  0.03  1  0.77  6367 
CRFND-ZRNAV  0.183  -0.140  -0.230  0.473  0.097  0.3 16  0.19  6367 
(10.9)  (23.9)  (10.5)  (11.7)  (2.19)  (8.01) 
(-3.46)  (50.0)  (18.8)  (4.49)  (0.85)  (1.36) 
(11.8)  (-5.68)  (-4.13)  (9.12)  (1.76)  (6.99) 
Univariate Regressions-Slope  Coefficients,  r-statistics, 
and Adjusted R2 
Dependent 
Variable  DISC  DFST  DEX  DWRD  Dsp  DSML 
CRFND  0.143 
(8.03) 
[0.041 
CRNAV  -0.064 
(-4.42) 
[0.01] 















































(13.3) C. Cumulative Return Horizon Is Thirteen Weeks (N = 13) 
Multivariate Regression-Slope  Coefficients and t-statistics 
Dependent  Number of 
Variable  DISC  DFST  mEX  DWRD  mSP  DSML-mSP  AdjustedR2  Observations 
ZRFND  0.375  0.600  0.645  0.487  0.193  0.187  0.59  6061 
CRNAV  -0.064  0.718  0.751  0.050  0.089  -0.010  0.82  606 1 
ERFND-CRNAV  0.439  -0.120  -0.106  0.437  0.104  0.196  0.36  6061 
(11.2)  (15.8)  (9.16)  (5.34)  (2.14)  (3.05) 
(-3.28)  (29.1)  (20.9)  (1.26)  (1.94)  (-0.30) 
(12.0)  (-3.73)  (-1.31)  (4.61)  (1.10)  (3.35) 
Univariate Regressions-Slope  Coefficients, t-statistics, 
and Adjusted R2 
ERFND  0.396 
(7.60) 
[0.09] 
CRNAV  -0.132 
(-3.16) 

















































(continued) Table 8.8A  (continued) 
”Results from multivariate and univariate regressions are presented. The multivariate regression is of the form 
N  N  N  N  N 
+ P,  C  (RSML,+n-RSP,+n)  + el.,++ 
where RET represents the de-meaned return on either the fund itself (RFND,),  the NAV  of fund i (RNAY),  or the difference 
(RFND,-RNAVJ. The regressions are estimated for cumulative return horizons of one, four, and thirteen weeks (N = 1,4,13) 
and are presented in panels A, B, and C, respectively. The equations are estimated by  stacking the country funds returns data 
so as to restrict the slope coefficients on the independent variables to be the same across funds. Numbers in parentheses are t- 
statistics corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity (panel A) autocorrelation of order N-  1 (panels B and C) using the methods 
in White 1980 and Newey and West 1987, respectively. In the univariate regressions, the numbers in square brackets are the 
adjusted R2s. 
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the NAV  are significant at each horizon although the magnitude of the differ- 
ence decreases with the return horizon. Country fund prices are apparently 
sticky with respect to movements in the host country’s stock market. 
A similar stickiness is observed in the response of country fund prices to the 
exchange rate. In the one-week horizon, fund prices show practically no reac- 
tion to changes in the exchange rate, when at the same time the NAV  shows a 
strong response: the fund return has a beta with REX of 0.088, while the NAV 
has a beta of 0.621.27  The difference between the fund beta and the NAV  beta 
weakens at longer holding horizons. As the horizon increases, the fund price 
becomes statistically indistinguishable from the response of the NAV to DEX. 
Consistent with both the excess volatility of fund returns and the existence 
of a strong common component among fund discounts, table 8.8.A shows that 
the fund returns are excessively sensitive to all three financial returns that are 
common across the different country funds. In the multivariate regressions, 
fund returns have significantly higher betas with respect to the world stock 
index return (RWRD) than NAV  returns at every holding-period horizon.28  In 
the univariate regression, we find that the beta of  the fund with respect to the 
world index is significantly larger than the beta of the NAV  with the world 
index. The difference is not affected by the return horizon. Thus, if the world 
index  is  the  appropriate benchmark  for measuring  wealth,  the result  sug- 
gests that the country funds are systematically riskier than  the underlying 
assets. 
Excess sensitivity is also present in the response to U.S. stock returns.29  For 
the one-week holding-period return, fund return betas with respect to RSP, the 
large-firm return index, are positive and statistically significant after control- 
ling for the return on the foreign (host country’s) market (RFST) and the world 
index (RWRD).  By comparison, the NAV  return displays absolutely no expo- 
sure to RSR Not surprisingly, the difference between the fund the NAV returns, 
RFND -  RNAV  has a significant positive beta with RSR However, the differ- 
ence between the exposures of  the fund and the NAV  to RSP is marginally 
statistically significant only at the one-week horizon (r-statistic = 7.22). At the 
four- and thirteen-week horizons, the difference is not significant. By contrast, 
and more interesting perhaps, fund return betas with respect to RSML -  RSP, 
the excess return on small U.S. firms, are significantly higher than the corre- 
sponding NAV  betas at every holding period horizon, after controlling for the 
effects of the other financial variables. 
27. The exchange rate, of course, is a component of the NAV computation (see section 8.3). 
28. That the NAV retains exposure to both the world index and the US.  index, after controlling 
for the local market return, may reflect the choice of fund managers to  invest in firms which are 
export-oriented  and more highly linked to the world and US.  economies than the firms represented 
in the host country’s stock market in general. 
29. This result may be implicit in  Bailey and Lim  1992. They find that  country fund  price 
volatility is higher during New York  trading hours than during host-country trading hours. 382  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
8.5.3 
Table 8.8A suggests that country fund prices overreact to U.S. and world 
financial returns, but underreact to price innovations in the stock markets of 
the host countries and to currency revaluations. Can the noise-trader story ac- 
commodate these observations? Although the model does not explicitly spec- 
ify  the  origin  or source of  investor  sentiment  and misperceptions,  Shiller 
(1 984) discusses two characterizations of sentiment which may be relevant for 
the pricing of country funds. In the first characterization, investors’ mispercep- 
tions of returns are the result of  an overreaction (or underreaction)  to news 
about fundamentals.  In this case, news about future dividends, for example, 
elicits an unwarranted change in the difference between noise traders’ percep- 
tion of future dividends on an asset and the corresponding perception of ratio- 
nal investors. In the context of publicly traded fund pricing, positive domestic 
news that increases the level of the broad U.S. market and positive  “world” 
news that raises the level of the world market would unduly raise the fund price 
and decrease the discount of country funds.30  Conversely, investors  may not 
make immediate effective use of all available information, and thus underreact 
to innovations in the host country’s stock market and to innovations in the ex- 
change rate. 
An alternative characterization of sentiment is given by  Shiller as follows: 
sentiment may be the result of “fluctuations in attitudes which occur widely in 
the population and often appear without any apparent logical reason.” In this 
case, variations in discounts on the country  funds would reflect  widespread 
changes in noise trader  sentiment unrelated  to changes in fundamentals.  A 
possible implication of this view is that the same investor sentiment that affects 
discounts on country funds must affect other assets as well which have little to 
do with the country funds. Recall from the theoretical discussion that if varia- 
tion in sentiment in country funds is not correlated with fundamentals,  then 
the same component of sentiment must appear across a wide range of assets. 
Although the theory does not specify which assets will be affected by the same 
widespread innovation in sentiment, a natural candidate for such assets is small 
capitalization stocks since individuals, who are more likely to trade on senti- 
ment and to misperceive fundamental value, specialize in both smaller stocks 
and publicly traded funds (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 1991). 
The results  in table  8.8A suggests that  both  interpretations of  the noise- 
trader model may have some validity. The strong link between changes in the 
discount and the financial variables RFST REX, RWRD, and RSP suggests that 
Is the Noise-Trader Interpretation Reasonable? 
30. Evidence of  such a phenomenon is found in Roll (1992), which shows that international 
stock correlations for firms within a given industry are “too low.” That country fund prices may 
overreact to innovations in  the world  index, controlling for innovations in  the domestic (US.) 
index may  be evidence that  country fund investors have  some sophistication in  that they  react 
(albeit excessively) to extranational events. Alternatively, country fund investor clienteles may 
include Japanese  individuals who overreact to  fundamental  innovations in their own country, 
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investors overreact to fundamental revaluations that are closer to home and 
underreact to those with which they are less familiar, supporting the first inter- 
pretation. Moreover, the explanatory power of excess small firm returns persist 
even when we  control for variables such as RWRD and RSR This provides 
substantial support for the second interpretation of the noise-trading hypothe- 
sis, assuming that the excess return of small firms captures a sentiment factor 
independent of fundamentals. 
8.5.4  Two Extensions: The Influence of the Japanese Market and the 
Asymmetric Effect of News 
The growth in country funds listed in New York has reflected more than just 
U.S.  investor demand. Just as the funds may be easy sells to American individ- 
uals, they may also appeal to Japanese individuals seeking to invest abroad. On 
February 19, 1990, near the market peak as measured by premia paid, market 
observers estimated that Japanese investors owned as much as 80 percent of 
the Spain and Germany funds. Some sources reported that major Japanese re- 
tail brokers were the buyers as prices rose and that they then sold the shares to 
their clients near the market top on the (irrational) enthusiasm generated by 
the events in Europe. The resultant sharp drop in the country fund premia, 
while reflecting the invariable dissipation of  ordinary-investor sentiment as 
modeled above, may  have  been accelerated by  Japanese individuals selling 
country fund shares in New York in order to meet margin calls on their port- 
folios as the Japanese equity market fell in the spring of  1990. Alternatively, 
as part of the general “panic” on the Tokyo market between January and April 
1990, Japanese individuals may have dumped international-linked assets, such 
as country funds, first. The fall in the prices of the funds held predominantly 
by  the Japanese generally exceeded the fall in the Japan Nikkei index.3i 
The events described in the financial press raise two interesting issues. First, 
is there any validity to the idea that prices of New York-traded  funds represent- 
ing Latin American, European, and Asian stocks can ostensibly diverge from 
fundamental value on the basis of developments in Japanese equity markets? 
Second, to what extent is investors’ overreaction documented in table 8.8A 
asymmetric, in the sense that negative news about world or U.S.  fundamentals 
has a stronger “panic” effect on country fund prices, while positive news or 
noise elicits a positive, albeit smaller, overreaction? 
To examine the first issue, we modified the behavioral excess return equation 
estimated in table 8.8A to include the current and one-to-four lagged returns 
of the Japanese stock market. We  also divided the time series of country fund 
returns into two subperiods: one part pertaining to the period of  supposedly 
31. To  see how the popular press covered these events, see Tatiana Pouschine, “How Do You 
Say  ‘Manipulation’ in Japanese,” Forbes,  19 February  1990; Nikhil  Hutheesing, “What  Did In 
Those Country Funds,” Forbes, 28 May 1990; Deborah Hargreaves, “Korea Fund Comes at Diffi- 
cult Time,” Financial Times, 24 April  1990; and “The Spain Fund Saga,” Burron’s, 25 September 
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heavy Japanese involvement, that is August 1989 to July 1990, and a second 
part pertaining to all other weeks. The regression was estimated separately 
for each of  the thirteen funds which spanned the period of  heavy Japanese 
inv01vement.~~  In general, our results were unimpressive. We  found little evi- 
dence that events in the Japanese stock market had an additional effect on 
country fund excess returns either for the whole sample or for the period of 
heavy Japanese involvement. Moreover, including the current and lag values of 
Japanese market returns in the regression did not affect the relationship be- 
tween  the  other  financial  variables  (DISC,  RFST,  REX,  RWRD,  RSt 
RSML -  RSP) and the excess country fund returns (RFND -  RNAV). 
To examine asymmetries, we experimented with regressions of the form 
The variable (D,,,+n)ps  takes on the value of  5,,,+,  when 5,,  ,+“ is positive 
and takes on the value “0” if D,,,,,  is otherwise. Conversely, (ml,r+,)Nc  takes 
on the value of Dl,,+,  if =,,,+,,  is negative and takes on the value “0” if u,,,,, 
is otherwise. If the excess return on country funds responds in an asymmetric 
fashion to innovation in the financial variable X,, the coefficients P,”  and PING 
will differ. 
Although we found little evidence of an asymmetric response of the funds’ 
excess returns with regard to the local stock market (RFST)  or exchange rate 
(REX) in both univariate and multivariate regressions, we did find evidence of 
asymmetry in the response to other financial variables. Table 8.8B presents 
the results of one multivariate specification where we allowed for asymmetric 
effects of RWRD, RSl? and RSML -  RSe for return horizons of one, four, and 
thirteen weeks. Two results stand out. First, at the one-week return horizon, 
but not at the four- or thirteen-week horizon, we find a significant asymmetric 
response  of  country  fund  excess  returns  to  the  excess  small  firm  return 
(RSML -  RSP). The oversensitivity to RSML -  RSP exists exclusively in a 
down market. That is, when negative sentiment unrelated to fundamentals af- 
fects individual investors, it (negatively) affects their demand for country funds 
to a larger extent than positive sentiment would. Second, using the four- and 
thirteen-week holding period returns, we found evidence of a significant asym- 
metric exposure of fund excess returns to world stock returns (RWRD).  Spe- 
cifically, the excess country fund returns are more greatly exposed to negative 
world stock returns than they are to positive world  stock returns. That the 
asymmetry is strongest at long horizons suggests that investors overreact much 
32. The funds are: BRZ, FAS, FIB, GER, SWH, ITL, KOR, MLY, MEX, SPN, TAW, THA, UKE Table 8.8B  Country Fund Return-Generating  Equations: Tests of Asymmetric Response to Financial Variablesa 
Slope Coefficients and r-statistics 
BWRD  CRSP  BSML-BSP  Test of No 
Return  Asymmetries 
Horizon  DISC  BFST  =EX  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)  AdjustedRZ  (p-value)  Observations 
1 week  -0.070  -0.184  -0.532  0.279  0.372  0.472  0.350  -0.141  0.573  0.12  0.00  6469 
(N= 1)  (-10.8)  (-6.58)  (-8.48)  (3.29)  (4.74)  (4.78)  (3.94)  (-1.55)  (5.10) 
4 weeks  -0.183  -0.141  -0.224  0.366  0.592  0.085  0.087  0.240  0.365  0.19  0.08  6367 
(N=  4)  (-11.8)  (-5.71)  (-4.00)  (4.99)  (6.50)  (1.19)  (0.89)  (3.16)  (4.20) 
13 weeks  -0.442  -0.102  -0.122  0.248  0.639  -0.023  0.124  0.182  0.222  0.37  0.00  606 1 
(N= 13)  (-12.1)  (-1.24)  (-3.78)  (2.08)  (4.62)  (-0.19)  (0.99)  (1.73)  (2.18) 
"Results from estimating multivariate regressions of the following form are presented: 
N  N  N  N  N 
(C  RFND8,+"  - C RNAV,,,,)  = Po + PIDISC,,  + P,  1  RFST,,,," + P,  1  REX,,+" + P,"  (1  RWRD,+JPS 
"=I  "=I  n= I  "=I  "=I 
N  N  N  N  N' 
+ P,"  ( 1  Rsp,+JPs  + P,"  (  (RSML,+,-RSP,+JPs + P,"  ( 1  RWRD,+JNG  + 13,"  ( C RSP,+JNC  + pp  ( C (RSML,+,-RSP,+~))~~  + e, ,+". 
n=1  n= I  "=I  n= I  ".=I 
Results for cumulative return horizons of one, four, and thirteen weeks (N = 1.4.13)  are presented. The equations are estimated by stacking the country 
funds returns data so as to restrict the slope coefficients on the independent variables to be the same across funds. Numbers in parentheses are t- 
statistics corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity (for N = 1) and autocorrelation of order N- 1 (for N = 4.13)  using the methods in White 1980 
and Newey and West 1987, respectively. The second to last column reports the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that the excess country fund 
returns display no asymmetries with respect to the financial variables, BWRD, BSe and (DSML -  BSML). 386  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
more strongly, over time, to negative news about world fundamentals than they 
do to positive news about world fundamentals. 
8.5.5  The Time-Varying Risk Hypothesis and Market Segmentation 
It is conceivable that the explanatory variables in the regressions in table 
8.8A capture the influence of time-varying risk premia in a model with market 
segmentation. If markets are segmented, innovations in the ratio of the domes- 
tic price of risk to the foreign market price of risk can affect the discounts. 
Such variation can result from changes in the volatility of domestic relative to 
foreign stock returns. All else constant, an increase in the domestic price of 
risk will reduce the price of the fund (and increase the discount), and at the 
same time reduce the domestic market price index. An increase in theforeign 
price of risk will reduce the NAV  (and lower the discount) while lowering the 
foreign market price index. Compared to the fund price, the effect of segmenta- 
tion would be to make the NAV  more highly correlated with the local market 
index (RFST), and less correlated with the domestic market  indices (RSP, 
RSML).  Moreover, because the discount would reflect the ratio of the domestic 
price of risk to the foreign market price of risk, the discount would help predict 
the excess return on a fund. 
The hypothesis of time-varying risk (as an explanation of time-varying fund 
discounts) can be tested without the need to model risk explicitly. To do this, 
we divided our sample of funds according to whether their host equity markets 
are restricted or unrestricted. In each group of funds, we regressed the excess 
fund return  (RFND -  RNAV) on the earlier set of  explanatory variables. If 
market  segmentation  plays  a  role  in  the  results  in  table  8.8A  then 
RFND -  RNAV will be more sensitive to foreign stock returns and less sensi- 
tive to U.S. (and world) stock returns for funds whose host countries restrict 
capital movements. Table 8.9 contains the results of these regressions as well 
as tests of coefficient differences along the two groups of funds. In the one- 
week return horizon the differences between the betas on the U.S. market indi- 
ces (RSP and RSML -  RSP) are not statistically significant (p-values = 0.99 
and 0.63).  Interestingly, the exposure of RFND -  RNAVof  the restricted funds 
to the local market stock index (RFST)  is significantly smaller than the expo- 
sure of  the unrestricted funds to the same variable (p-value = 0.07). At  the 
four-week return horizon, the differences in domestic market betas remain sta- 
tistically insignificant, while the foreign market beta of  the restricted funds 
remains significantly lower than that of the unrestricted funds. At the thirteen- 
week horizon, none of the observed betas differ significantly across the two 
groups. Thus, the overall results show no strong evidence that market segmen- 
tation plays a role in the time-variation in discounts. Consequently, models of 
time-varying risk premia may have a difficult time explaining the variability of 
excess fund returns. Explicitly modeling the time-variation in the ratio of the 
foreign to domestic price of risk is left to future research. Table 8.9  Country Fund Return-Generating Equations: Results for Restricted and Unrestricted Marketsa 
A. Cumulative Return Horizon Is One Week (N  = 1) 
Slope Coefficients and t-statistics 
Market Status 
(number of funds)  DISC  DFST  DEX  DWRD  ERSP  DSML-DSP  Adjusted R2  Observations 
Restricted  0.069  -0.113  0.188  0.482  0.395  0.345  0.12  2238 
(13)  (8.38)  (-4.07)  (1.13)  (6.19)  (4.57)  (3.86) 
Unrestricted  0.069  -0.244  -0.601  0.3 11  0.394  0.160  0.12  423  1 
(21)  (7.65)  (-5.03)  (-9.37)  (4.86)  (5.68)  (2.17) 
Test of subsample 
differences (p- 
value)  0.75  0.07  0.00  0.03  0.99  0.63 
B. Cumulative Return Horizon Is Four Weeks (N  = 4) 
Slope Coefficients and t-statistics 
Market Status 
(number of funds)  DISC  DFST  DEX  DWRD  DSP  IRSML-DSP  Adjusted R2  Observations 
Restricted  0.182  -0.074  0.159  0.532  0.180  0.351  0.22  2199 
(13)  (9.61)  (-2.19)  (0.93)  (6.19)  (1.92)  (4.68) 
Unrestricted  0.183  -0.1%  -0.290  0.482  0.064  0.277  0.18  4168 
(21)  (8.48)  (-5.60)  (-4.90)  (7.36)  (0.94)  (4.94) 
Test of subsample 
differences (p- 
value)  0.96  0.01  0.01  0.64  0.3  I  0.43 
(continued) Table 8.9  (continued) 
C. Cumulative Return Horizon Is Thirteen Weeks (N = 13) 
Slope Coefficients and t-statistics 
Market Status 
(number of funds)  DISC  DFST  BEX  DWRD  DSP  DSML-DSP  Adjusted R2  Observations 
Restricted  0.482  -0.098  0.243  0.555  0.083  0.236  0.43  2082 
(13)  (10.5)  (- 2.34)  (1.08)  (3.39)  (0.45)  (2.08) 
Unrestricted  0.409  -0.151  -0.157  0.414  0.127  0.138  0.33  3079 
(21)  (8.13)  (-3.08)  (-1.73)  (3.60)  (1.15)  (1.90) 
Test of subsample 
differences (p- 
value)  0.29  0.41  0.10  0.46  0.81  0.46  -  - 
"Results from multivariate regressions of the following form are presented: 
N  N  N  N  N  N 
(c  RFND4,," - I; RNAY,+J = Po + PIDISC,, + P,  C  RFST,+" + P,  E REX,,+" + P,  I; RWRD,+" + P,  C RSP,+" 
+ P,  C (RSML,+n -  RSP,,,)  + ea,+". 
n= I  "=I  "=I  "=I  n=l  n= I 
N 
"=I 
The sample of country funds is divided into two groups, each representing funds investing in restricted and unrestricted equity markets, respectively. 
The regressions are estimated for cumulative return horizons of one, four, and thirteen weeks (N = 1,4,13) and are presented in panels A, B, and C, 
respectively. The equations are estimated by stacking the country funds returns data so as to restrict the slope coefficients on the independent variables 
to be the same across country funds within each group. Numbers in parentheses are r-statistics corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity (panel A) 
and autocorrelation of order N-1 (panels B and C) using the methods in White (1980) and Newey and West (1987), respectively, The last line in each 
panel reports the p-values associated with the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across the two groups of funds. See the text for a description 
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8.5.6  Emerging Equity Markets Versus Developed Equity Markets 
In the last few years, a number of foreign stock markets have become in- 
creasingly liquid and have emerged as vehicles for international investment. 
The International Finance Corporation classifies the stock markets of the fol- 
lowing countries represented in our sample of  country funds as “emerging 
markets”: Portugal, Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines,  India, Indo- 
nesia, Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan. Because these markets are new 
to U.S.  investors, information about fundamentals affecting asset prices in 
these countries may be harder (or costlier) to collect and interpret. As a result, 
the country fund price may  be sticky with respect to developments in the 
emerging  markets which affect fundamentals.  Conversely, U.S. investors might 
place undue reliance on information on U.S. fundamentals as a substitute for 
fundamentals in the foreign market. To test for differences between emerging 
and developed markets, we divided our sample of funds according to whether 
the host market is developed or emerging, and for each group regressed the 
excess fund return RFND -  RNAV on the financial variables in multivariate re- 
gressions. 
Table 8.10 contains the results of these regressions along with tests of coef- 
ficient differences along the emerging and developed funds. The results for 
return horizons of one, four, and thirteen weeks are presented in panels A, B, 
and C, respectively. In the one-, four-, and thirteen-week horizons, the betas of 
excess returns (RFND -  RNAV) of the emerging-market funds are generally 
more highly exposed to U.S.  and world risk than are the excess returns of the 
developed-market funds. However, these differences are far from statistically 
significant. There is weak evidence, on the other hand, that the excess sensitiv- 
ity of emerging-market funds to the excess return on small-cap U.S. firms is 
greater than the corresponding exposure of the developed markets (p-values = 
0.1  in panel A, 0.05  in panel B). Speculative bullishness by  individuals for 
small firms may coincide with small investor sentiment for small countries. 
8.5.7  Regional Differences and Trading Hours Mismatch 
As noted in our data section, the period over which the fund return is com- 
puted does not exactly overlap with the period over which the NAV  return is 
computed. This mismatch arises because the local currency net asset value of 
the country funds is computed on the basis of the market prices prevailing at 
the close of stock trading in the host country. The fund’s price in dollars, how- 
ever, is computed on the basis of the last market transaction closest to the close 
of trading on the New York or American stock exchanges. Thus, fund prices 
and NAVs are only approximately synchronous. 
Nonsynchronous returns data may introduce biases in the return-generating 
equations estimated above, especially for the one-week horizon returns. For 
example, suppose that the U.S. and foreign fundamentals are correlated, and a 
country fund’s price observations are matched with the weekly close of  the 
U.S.  market, while its NAV  is matched with the weekly close of the local mar- Table 8.10  Country Fund Retun-Generating Equations: Results for Emerging and Developed Equity Markets” 
A. Cumulative Return Horizon Is One Week (N = 1) 
Slope Coefficients and t-statistics 
Market Status 
(number of funds)  DISC  XRFST  DEX  DWRD  DSP  DSML-DSP  Adjusted RZ  Observations 
Emerging  0.064  -0.167  -0.337  0.415  0.393  0.310  0.10  3120 
(18)  (7.97)  (-5.06)  (-2.51)  (5.83)  (4.72)  (3.52) 
Developed  0.079  -0.222  -0.661  0.343  0.372  0.141  0.14  3349 
(16)  (7.17)  (-5.19)  (-10.6)  (4.94)  (5.36)  (2.00) 
Test of subsample 
differences (p- 
value)  0.27  0.31  0.03  0.47  0.84  0.13 
B. Cumulative Return Horizon Is Four Weeks (N = 4) 
Slope Coefficients and r-statistics 
Market Status 
(number of funds)  DISC  DFST  DEX  XRWRD  DSP  DSML-XRSP  Adjusted RZ  Observations 
Emerging  0.161  -0.152  -0.121  0.542  0.159  0.366  0.20  3066 
(13)  (8.94)  (-5.82)  (-1.29)  (7.18)  (1.86)  (5.44) 
Developed  0.221  -0.059  -0.353  0.408  0.007  0.187  0.19  3301 
(21)  (7.92)  (-0.90)  (-5.85)  (5.34)  (0.10)  (3.20) 
Test of subsample 
differences (p- 
value)  0.05  0.18  0.04  0.21  0.16  0.05 C. Cumulative Return Horizon Is Thirteen Weeks (N = 13) 
Slope Coefficients and t-statistics 
Market Status 
(number of funds)  DISC  WFST  WEX  CRWRD  CRSP  CRSML-CRSP  Adjusted R’  Observations 
Emerging  0.385  -0.159  -0.177  0.473  0.184  0.274  0.37  2904 
(18)  (8.85)  (-4.58)  (- 1.57)  (3.09)  (1.15)  (2.98) 
Developed  0.538  -0.038  -0.004  0.292  0.026  0.127  0.37  3157 
(16)  (8.30)  (-0.51)  (-0.06)  (2.60)  (0.23)  (I  .87) 
Test of subsample 
differences (p- 
value)  0.05  0.02  0.19  0.33  0.42  0.20 
aResults from estimating multivariate regressions of the following form are presented: 
N  N  N  N  N  N 
The sample of  country funds is divided into two groups, each representing either funds investing in emerging markets or funds investing in developed 
markets. The regressions are estimated for cumulative return horizons of one, four, and thirteen weeks (N = I ,4,13) and are presented in panels A, B, 
and C, respectively. The equations are estimated by  stacking the country funds returns data so as to restrict the slope coefficients on the independent 
variables to be the same across country funds within each group. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity 
(panel A) and autocorrelation of order N-l (panels B and C) using the methods in White (1980) and Newey and West (1987), respectively. The last 
line in each panel reports the p-values associated with the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across the two groups of funds. See the text 
for a description of the classification of funds into the emerging and developed samples. 392  Gikas Hardouvelis, Rafael La Porta, and Thierry A. Wizman 
ket. Then both the correlation of the fund’s return with the foreign market and 
the correlation of the NAV return with the U.S. market will be biased down- 
ward. As a result, the excess return on the fund may display an excess negative 
correlation with the foreign market and an excess positive correlation with the 
U.S.  market,  even  if  both  fund and  NAV  reflect  fundamental  information. 
These biases will be least severe for funds whose host countries have trading 
hours most synchronous with the U.S. markets, and most severe for funds in- 
vesting in countries whose trading hours are least synchronous. 
To examine whether nonsynchronous data can explain part of the correla- 
tions observed in table 8.8A, we partitioned our sample into three groups based 
on the geographical region: East Asian (including Australia) funds, European 
(including  Turkey)  funds, and  Latin  American  funds. The Latin  American 
funds’ NAV  data are the most  synchronous with the actual price data from 
New  York  trading.  The  East  Asian  funds are  the  least  synchronous.  For 
each  geographic  group,  we  regressed  the  one-week  excess  fund  return, 
RFND -  RNAV  on the explanatory variables. If nonsynchronous trading ac- 
counts for part of the results in table 8.8A, then the RFND -  RNAV of the East 
Asian funds will have the greatest (positive) exposure to U.S.  stock returns, 
and the greatest (negative) exposure to local stock returns. Excess returns on 
Latin American would have the least exposure to both U.S.  and local stock re- 
turns. 
Table 8.11 contains the results of the regressions for the one-week holding- 
period horizon (where biases would be most important). The European funds 
have greater exposure to the local market stock returns (RFST)  than either the 
Asian or Latin American funds. These differences are statistically significant 
in each case. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference between the betas 
of the Asian and Latin American funds with respect to the foreign stock re- 
turns. The excess returns of the Latin American funds have more exposure to 
the U.S.  return indices (RSP  and RSML -  RSP)  than do the Asian or European 
funds, even though the Latin funds suffer less from nonsynchronous  price/ 
NAV observations. This difference is statistically significant for the beta with 
the large U.S. firm index, RSP, although insignificant for RSP -  RSML. Thus, 
the findings in table 8.11 do not support the hypothesis that nonsynchronous 
data play a role in the findings of table 8.8A. 
8.6  Conclusion 
This paper examined the weekly price behavior of thirty-five country funds 
that traded on the New York and American stock exchanges between 1985 and 
1993. The aim was to characterize some basic empirical regularities of country 
fund prices and to examine the extent to which the noise-trader model of asset 
prices is consistent with the regularities. 
Unlike domestic-equity funds, not all country funds trade at an average dis- 
count. However, controlling for the effect of cross-border restrictions, we find Table 8.11  Country Fund Return-Generating Equations: Results for East Asian, European, and Latin American Funds' 
Slope Coefficients and r-statistics 
Region 
(number of funds)  DISC  DFST  =EX  DWRD  DSP  DSML-DSP  Adjusted R2  Observations 
East Asian Funds  0.068  -0.157  -0.438  0.460  0.358  0.238  0.1 1  2406 
(13)  (8.08)  (-5.25)  (-5.77)  (5.77)  (4.34)  (2.54) 
European  0.073  -0.278  -0.670  0.425  0.3 I7  0.176  0.14  3097 
(15)  (6.94)  (-7.23)  (-11.0)  (5.88)  (4.29)  (2.39) 
Latin American  0.064  -0.139  -0.327  0.139  0.648  0.301  0.08  966 
(6)  (3.62)  (-2.00)  (-1.97)  (I .07)  (3.49)  (1.75) 
"Results from estimating multivariate regressions of  the following form are presented: 
N  N  N  N  N  N 
The sample of  country funds is divided into three groups representing funds investing in the Far East, Europe, and Latin America, respectively. 
Regressions are estimated for cumulative return horizons of one week (N = 1). The equations are estimated by  stacking the country funds returns data 
so as to restrict the slope coefficients on the independent variables to be the same across country funds within each group. Numbers in parentheses are 
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that country funds adhere to the stylized facts established for domestic-equity 
funds: in the long run, discounts prevail for funds whose host countries allow 
free cross-border capital movements. Like their domestic-equity counterparts, 
country funds are typically issued at a premium, and this premium erodes by 
about 20 percent over the twenty-four weeks that follow the IPO. The deterio- 
ration in the premium is the same for funds invested in restricted markets and 
those invested in unrestricted markets. 
The noise-trading model of DeLong et al. (1990) can easily explain the pre- 
vious evidence. The average discount for funds invested in countries with no 
restrictions  on capital movements is attributable  to noise-trader  risk,  which 
depresses fund prices relative to the NAVs. The premium at the initiation of a 
country fund is explained by the ability of fund organizers to time the issuance 
of country funds to coincide with positive investor sentiment. The subsequent 
decline in the premium is explained by mean-reversion in investor sentiment. 
Discounts vary substantially over time and contribute to a variance in coun- 
try fund returns  which  is generally three times greater than the variance of 
the return on the underlying assets. However, discounts are largely stationary, 
implying either that the NAV  captures information  about fundamental  value 
not captured in the fund price (that is, the fund is mispriced); the fund price 
contains information about the fundamental value not captured in the market 
value of the underlying assets; or both the fund price and the NAV carry funda- 
mental information not captured by the other. Regressions of fund returns and 
NAV returns on discounts suggest that the discount has significant predictive 
power for the fund return, but little predictive power for the NAV return. This 
asymmetry suggests that mean-reverting sentiment is an important component 
of the price of the country funds but not in the market value of the underlying 
assets, so that it is the fund which is primarily mispriced. This is consistent 
with the idea that compared to the investor clienteles of country funds’ under- 
lying assets (presumably foreign institutions and individuals), U.S. individu- 
als, the investor clientele of country funds, are prone to trade on sentiment and 
to misperceive fundamental value. 
Estimation of an unobserved components model on the discounts of the nine 
oldest funds reveals a common component which is strongly persistent. This 
common and persistent behavior is consistent with the structure imposed on 
the noise-trader model by DeLong et al. (1990), which requires that variation 
in sentiment be systematic if it is to be priced in equilibrium.  The common 
component we estimate accounts for roughly  20 percent  of  the variance of 
weekly country fund discounts. Examination of the estimated common compo- 
nent reveals that systematic variation in sentiment may be driven  in part by 
widely noted world events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall in  1990. In the 
aftermath of this event, country fund IPOs peaked. 
To capture the source of part of the variation in discounts over time, we ran 
regressions of the fund return, the NAV return, and their difference-the  ex- 
cess fund return-on  returns of a number of aggregate financial variables. We 395  What Moves the Discount on Country Equity Funds? 
find that fund prices are “sticky,” that is, they do not move as much as their 
respective NAVs with respect to movements in the host country’s aggregate 
stock market. Similarly, fund prices, which are quoted in dollars, are sticky 
with respect to exchange-rate revaluations, although this is largely a short- 
horizon phenomenon. On the other hand, fund prices are overly sensitive to 
movements in world stock returns and to U.S. stock returns as captured by the 
Standard and Poor’s 500. The oversensitivity to the world stock market index 
is present for all holding-period horizons that we examine. Hence, if discounts 
reflect the sentiment and misperceptions of the country funds’ investor clien- 
tele, then this sentiment is partly driven by “world” fundamentals. 
The excess return on U.S. small firms, which are predominantly traded by 
individual investors, is also a significant factor in explaining contemporaneous 
country fund excess returns. Country fund prices are overly sensitive to the 
small-firmAarge-firm return differential. This result is robust to the inclusion 
of  other financial variables correlated with fund discounts, and is also robust 
to the return horizon. The finding upholds Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler’s (1991) 
idea that sentiment, if it is systematic, will affect assets with little fundamental 
similarity to country funds except that they share the same investor clientele, 
namely individual U.S.  investors. 
A model of rational traders could potentially explain the above correlations 
if  the model were enriched by  introducing sufficient frictions. However, we 
provide evidence which casts doubt on the ability of  rational models in the 
context of market imperfections to explain variation in country fund discounts. 
First, apart from the evidence on the average discounts, we find no evidence 
that the discounts of  funds whose host countries restrict cross-border equity 
investments behave differently from the discounts of  funds that invest in un- 
restricted markets. Moreover, we also find little evidence in favor of  market 
frictions caused by informational factors, or by nonsynchronous data. For ex- 
ample, the excess returns of funds invested in emerging markets, where infor- 
mation about fundamentals may be harder or costlier to obtain, do not exhibit 
a higher correlation with the U.S. market than the excess returns of country 
funds in developed markets. Similarly, the excess returns of funds whose price 
and NAV  data suffer from the most time-mismatch do not generally exhibit 
higher correlations with the U.S. market. Overall, the facts we uncover present 
a challenge to asset-pricing models based on fully rational international in- 
vestors. 
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Comment  Vihang Errunza 
The paper investigates the behavior of country fund (CF) premiuddiscounts. 
After analyzing some basic empirical regularities, the authors test various 
hypotheses based on noise-trading literature. (See, for example, DeLong et al. 
1990 and Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 1991.) They conclude that the data are 
consistent with the models of investor sentiment. 
In general, the topic is interesting and timely. On balance the empirical tests 
are conducted with care. To avoid duplication, I do not discuss the issues re- 
lated to data (e.g., dividendcapital gains distributions),  and insights regarding 
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discounts on closed-end funds covered by my codiscussant Rob Neal. I focus 
on the equilibrium determinants of country fund premiuddiscounts. 
The authors seem to suggest that stationary discounts imply noise trading 
whereas nonstationarity  implies market segmentation (section 8.4.4). I do not 
understand this line of reasoning since market segmentation is consistent with 
stationarity. Further, 40 to 60 percent of  discounts (table 8.5) are nonstationary. 
Thus, one cannot dismiss the importance of market segmentation. In essence, 
given the results, a more complete understanding of premiuddiscounts should 
include explanations other than noise trading. 
There are three approaches that provide insights regarding country fund pre- 
mia. The traditional  literature (e.g., Malkiel  1977 and Brauer  1984) suggests 
fees, illiquid stocks, and taxes as explanations of the discounts on U.S. closed- 
end funds. Similarly, as argued by  the authors, noise-trading models suggest 
that systematic variations in (individual) investor sentiment would render CFs 
riskier and underpriced relative to fundamentals, thus leading to discounts on 
CFs. Of course, this requires that funds and underlying assets are not equally 
subject to the  same variation in noise trader  sentiment. Finally, equilibrium 
models of international asset pricing under barriers to capital flows (e.g., Stulz 
198  1 and Errunza and Losq 1989) suggest that unrestricted domestic securities 
will be priced by global risk, and that restricted foreign securities will be priced 
by global and national risks. Further, if foreign assets can be fully spanned by 
domestic assets, the national risk premium will disappear. The integrating im- 
pact of CFs leads to the conclusion that there will be no premiuddiscount on 
CFs. The models implicitly assume perfect cross-border arbitrage. 
Thus, the available models deliver discounts or zero premiuddiscounts on 
CFs. The reality is, however, quite different. For example, some CFs have fluc- 
tuated between substantial premiums and discounts over time (e.g., Malaysia 
Fund), whereas others have traded consistently at high premiums (e.g., Korea 
Fund).  Moreover,  the  authors report  consistent  premiums  for the  restricted 
sample (table 8.4). Thus an appropriate model must explain average premiums 
or discounts for a fund, it must explain the average premiuddiscount across 
funds at a given time, and it must explain time-series behavior of premiuddis- 
counts. 
Diwan, Errunza, and Senbet (1993) develop a new equilibrium international 
asset pricing model (IAPM) that incorporates barriers to capital flows, imper- 
fect substitution between the CF  and its underlying assets, imperfect arbitrage, 
and investor sentiment. The model suggests that in equilibrium, the premium/ 
discount will depend on the degree of  access to the originating market, the 
degree of spanning of foreign assets within the host (U.S.) market, the degree 
of  substitution between the fund and its underlying assets, and the common 
global country fund premia.'  In empirical tests, the authors use the return on 
1. The Errunza (1991) model, although it does not explicitly consider investor sentiment, deliv- 
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the world market portfolio (&),  Standard and Poor’s 500, and Russell 2000 to 
capture  commonality  among funds, whereas  Diwan,  Errunza,  and  Senbet 
[  19931 use the value-weighted average premiuddiscount on U.S.-traded coun- 
try funds to proxy  the  common  factor. The similarity between the  authors’ 
common factor (figure 8.3) and the value-weighted average premiuddiscounts 
on U.S.-traded country funds (reported as figure 3 in part I of Diwan, Ermnza, 
and Senbet [  19931) is striking. Further, the time-series and cross-sectional test 
results of Diwan, Errunza, and Senbet (1993) are consistent with the predic- 
tions of the IAPM. 
Finally,  CFs from perfectly  integrated  markets  (e.g.,  United  Kingdom) 
should be priced similarly to U.S. closed-end funds. In other words, traditional 
factors and noise trading should explain their discount behavior. However, the 
available evidence  suggests that  most markets are not fully integrated. In a 
mildly segmented world market structure, the CF  premiums/discounts will be 
determined by the factors suggested by IAPMs, traditional literature, and in- 
vestor sentiment. In summary, the paper is very interesting but it could benefit 
from the theoretical insights of IAPMs. 
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Comment  Robert Neal 
Closed-end country funds are interesting for two reasons. First, they provide a 
convenient channel for international funds to be invested in a specific country. 
This channel can be valuable to countries attempting to attract capital and to 
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investors attempting to reduce risk (Diwan, Ermnza, and Senbet 1993). Sec- 
ond, closed-end funds are now the subject of spirited debate. A recent paper 
by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) has prompted researchers to look outside 
the conventional model of investor behavior and consider whether investor sen- 
timent can influence returns. Regardless of  one’s prior beliefs regarding the 
role of  investor sentiment, we can all agree that careful analysis of  new data 
helps our understanding of these issues. Herein lies the key contribution of the 
paper by Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman. The paper seeks to explain the 
time-series behavior of country fund returns by using economic factors, as well 
as proxies for market sentiment. Their approach focuses on the forecast power 
of discounts and thus should be more convincing to a skeptical reader. 
Overall, the paper makes a solid contribution to our understanding of coun- 
try fund returns. Where the paper falls short, it is due to the large scope of the 
analysis. The paper provides a model of fund discounts, discusses the stylized 
facts of  country funds, and seeks to resolve the country fund discount puzzle. 
Given this range of  issues, the paper is remarkably thorough. My comments 
fall into four areas: the noise-trader model, the dividend adjustment process, 
the cross-correlations between price changes and net asset value changes, and 
the interpretation of the regression results. Most of  my  criticisms are already 
addressed in the paper but I still feel there is room for improvement. 
Let me  first focus on their model. The paper presents a model of  noise- 
trader risk and country fund discounts. The model can be summarized in the 
following two relations: 
1. E(Fund Return,) = u, + 6,  Cov(sentiment innovations, wealth) + c,  senti- 
ment, and 
2. Discount, = b,Cov(sentiment innovations, wealth) + c,  sentiment. 
In this notation, un  is determined by  the fundamentals of  the fund. Since the 
fundamental return can be represented by  the NAV  return, subtracting the u, 
from both sides of (1) will yield (2). 
In this model, it is necessary to assume that investor sentiment is not per- 
fectly forecastable, cannot be diversified away,  and has a stronger effect on 
fund returns than the average stock. Given these assumptions, investor senti- 
ment can affect fund returns. This holds even if the expected value of the senti- 
ment is zero, as long as the covariance between  sentiment innovations and 
wealth is nonzero. While this framework has an intuitive appeal, it is subject to 
several criticisms. First, it associates the entire discount movement to investor 
sentiment innovations. There is no role for nonsentiment factors such as those 
considered by Malkiel(1977), Brauer (1984), or by Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, 
and Wheatley (1990). Second, it is possible that country fund sentiment is a 
proxy for some unspecified time varying risk premium. Neal and Wheatley 
(1993) show that this is unlikely for domestic funds, but do not extend the 
analysis to country funds. Third, if markets are segmented to some degree, it 
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the valuation based on the fundamentals may differ for domestic and foreign 
investors. 
A second issue is that the adjustment for dividends can be improved. The 
paper provides two ways to calculate the change in the premium. 
(Rfund  -  R,,,)  = In[(Fund Price, + Dividend,)/Fund Price,-,] -  ln[(NAV, 
+ Dividend,)/NAV,- ,I and 
These two approaches will produce different values for the changes when pre- 
counts (or premiums) are large and the dividend payout is large. For example, 
suppose the price of  a fund is $30, the NAV  is $20, and the dividend is $5. 
Before the dividend, the fund has a 50 percent premium. Suppose that the 
premium is unaffected by  the dividend, so the ex-dividend price is $22.50. 
This implies that the fund return will be negative while the NAV  return is zero. 
Moreover, the adjustment process for large discount or premium funds should 
probably focus on the announcement date, and not the ex-date. As a practical 
matter, I doubt that these adjustments would have a large effect on their find- 
ings except, perhaps, for the Taiwan Fund, which traded at large premiums and 
paid large dividends. 
A third issue is that some of their results may be influenced by the relatively 
large cross-correlations between a fund’s price and the NAV.  For example, in 
Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1  990), the average cross-correlation 
for country funds between the change in price at time t and the change in NAV 
at time r -  1 is .24. Similarly, the average between the change in price, and the 
change in NAV, + , is .29. If these cross-correlations result from nonsynchron- 
ous trading or delayed reporting, then the predictive power of discounts to ex- 
plain subsequent fund returns may be overstated. I doubt that this would have 
much effect on the regressions in table 8.6 and tables 8.7 through 8.11, which 
are based on thirteen-week intervals. However, the cross-correlations certainly 
have the potential to influence the regressions based on one- and four-week 
intervals. A related point is that the regressions that are based on the four- and 
thirteen-week intervals use overlapping data. As Kim and Nelson (1990) have 
shown, the use of  overlapping data can make the regression R2  an unreliable 
measure. 
The fourth issue is the author’s interpretation of table 8.8A. This table con- 
tains the main regression result in the paper: fund returns are regressed against 
home country returns, the change in exchange rates, the Standard and Poor’s 
500 return, the world return, U.S. small firm  returns, and the lagged discount. 
Similar regressions are presented using the NAV  returns and the difference 
between fund returns and NAV  returns. My interpretation of these regressions 
is that after controlling for fundamentals, there is evidence that discounts have 
forecast power, and this is consistent with the noise-trader model. Their inter- 
pretation is much stronger. In their view, each of these “fundamental” factors 
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reflect innovations in investor sentiment, and significant t-statistics for these 
factors therefore provide additional  support for their noise-trader  model. As 
indicated above, however, if markets are segmented, then their conclusion may 
be unwarranted. 
A related issue is that I found the regression in table 8.8B to be unconvinc- 
ing. This regression is similar to that in table 8.8A, except that it allows for an 
asymmetric response to the independent variables. The motivation for this sec- 
tion is that Japanese investors, who supposedly drove up the price of country 
funds in 1989-90,  faced a liquidity constraint when the Japanese market fell 
in  1990. Hence the performance of funds may differ between up and down 
markets. They find little evidence of a Japanese effect, but do report an asym- 
metric effect from the return to the world portfolio. They conclude that small 
investors overreact more strongly to negative news than to positive news. While 
this is an interesting result, the link to the existing theory is not obvious, and 
there is also the possibility that fund managers changed their portfolios in re- 
sponse to anticipated changes in the market. 
Finally, it is possible that the forecast power of discounts may reflect com- 
mon changes in the relative price of risk. If markets are segmented then dis- 
counts should be proportional to the ratio of the domestic price of risk to the 
foreign price of risk. Changes in the domestic price of risk will therefore affect 
all country fund discounts and could induce a common time-series variation in 
discounts. It would be interesting to include proxies for the domestic price of 
risk as another variable in table 8.8A regressions. Alternatively, for countries 
with multiple country funds (Germany, Taiwan, etc.), it would be interesting to 
see whether funds from the same country behave similarly. 
In summary, this paper provides  a comprehensive  analysis of  closed-end 
country funds. The paper provides many interesting results, including evidence 
that lagged discounts have predictive power for future fund returns. While the 
authors’ interpret their results as offering strong support for the investor senti- 
ment story, I suggest a more cautious interpretation. I am also concerned that 
noise-trader models can rationalize almost any behavior. However, I have yet 
to see a convincing model of discounts that is based on rationality. The least 
implausible model I have seen is the costly arbitrage model by Pontiff (1993). 
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